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LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 12(2) OF THE SECURITIES




Traditionally, section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 19332 (1933
Act) has extended a rescission cause of actions to the defrauded
buyer against her immediate seller. This concept of "privity"
expressly limits the prospective class of defendants. 4 Assuming
that a plaintiff could establish all the elements of a section 12(2)
cause of action,3 including this built-in privity requirement, a
well-accepted body of case law developed that assumed a cause
of action existed on behalf of the defrauded buyer against her
"seller" in the context of distribution transactions, as well as
secondary, postdistribution trading transactions.6
* Professor of Law, Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A., University
of California, Irvine, 1978; J.D., UCLA, 1981. Copyright 1990. All rights reserved. The
award of a Rains Fellowship from Loyola Law School provided valuable research support
in the preparation of this Article. The author gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful
comments of her colleagues, Ralph Blakeney, Jan Costello, Jennifer Shurtleff, and Kay
Tate, on an earlier draft of this Article. The author also wishes to thank Thelma Terre
for her invaluable assistance and the law firm of Urland, Morello, Dunn & Maynard,
Santa Ana, California, for graciously extending use of its research library.
1. 15 U.S.C. S 77/(2) (1988).
2. 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-77aa.
3. Section 12(2) is a rescission statute, seeking to effect a refund to the defrauded
buyer in exchange for a return to the seller of the purchased security. See L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1022-25 (1983).
4. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641-55 (1988), now defines the scope of "seller," at least
for purposes of S 12(1). See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text (discussing the S 12
privity concept as the Supreme Court recently interpreted it).
5. See infra notes 14-127 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of S 12(2)
cause of action).
6. See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1990); Carrott
v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 724 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1984); Franklin Say. Bank v. Levy,
551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977); Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. dmied, 311 U.S.
705 (1940); Quincy Co-op. Bank v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D.
Mass. 1986); Monetary Management of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 615 F.
Supp. 1217 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Roger v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 222
(S.D. Ohio 1984); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88 (ED. Pa. 1983).
In each of these opinions, the courts never questioned the availability of a S 12(2) cause
of action for fraud in connection with the postdistribution trading transactions at issue.
Moreover, Congress has not seen fit to repudiate this body of authority; presumably,
Congress' silence indicates its implicit approval of the application of S 12(2) to postdistri-
bution transactions. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddieston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983).
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Recently, however, a growing body of federal case law has
denied a section 12(2) cause of action to the defrauded buyer in
the context of a postdistribution trading transaction.7 These courts
reason, in a strained and rather distorted reading of the statute,
that the 1933 Act concerns itself exclusively with the distribution
markets whereas the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 (1934 Act)
focuses primarily on the trading markets. 9 Based on this cursory
7. See T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc. v. Preletz, 749 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md.
1990); Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,437 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Leonard v. Stuart-James Co., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,442 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Cheltenham Bank v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,391 (E.D.N.C. 1989); First Union
Brokerage v. Milos, 717 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1989); McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,423 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Mix v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1989); Panek v. Bogucz, 718 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J.
1989); Leonard v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Pa.
1988); Ralph v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1322 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Strong v.
Paine Webber, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,
678 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,207 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc.,
591 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp.
1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). By comparison, only six district courts have concluded that the
S 12(2) remedy is available to the defrauded secondary market buyer. See Farley v. Baird,
Patrick & Co., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,658 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 88-0285, 0286, 0307 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Elysian Fed. Say. Bank v. First Interregional Equity,
713 F. Supp. 737 (D.N.J. 1989); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., No. 88-6867
(ED. Pa. Dec. 27, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), 'rev'd, 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.
1991); Scotch v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 95 (M.D.
Pa. 1988); Wilko v. Swann, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Part 11 of this Article more
fully examines the reasoning of these cases.
As this Article was being finalized for publication, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit handed down its decision in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker,
Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit, in reversing the district court's
decision, concluded as a matter of law "that the language and the legislative history of
section 12(2) demonstrate that Congress did not there intend to protect buyers in the
aftermarket, and we hold that section 12(2) provides a remedy to buyers of securities
only in initial distributions." Id. at 684 (emphasis added). In adopting this interpretation
of 5 12(2), the Third Circuit's reasoning essentially mirrors that of those district courts
that have reached the same conclusion. The Third Circuit's reasoning therefore is subject
to the same criticisms as set forth in Part Id of this Article.
8. 15 U.S.C. SS 78a-78kk (1988).
9. "Securities markets" is the broad term used to refer to both (i) the distribution
market whereby issuers raise capital by selling securities to investors and (ii) the
secondary markets which provide liquidity for these investors by providing an organized
marketplace for the continuous trading of securities previously issued and outstanding.
See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRITIEs LAW HANDBOOK 28 (1989-90 ed.) (footnote
omitted) ("Securities markets can conveniently be divided for exposition purposes into
distribution markets and trading markets."); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURTIs REG-
ILATION 1 (6th ed. 1987) ("The broad term 'securities markets' encompasses both the
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characterization of these two great and complex pieces of federal
legislation, these courts have struck down the defrauded buyer's
section 12(2) cause of action on the ground that the transaction
at issue occurred in the postdistribution market. In so doing,
many of these courts interpret the term "prospectus" as used in
section 12(2) to reflect Congress' intent to limit recovery to those
buyers who were defrauded during the course of a "public offer-
ing." This line of reasoning, however, fundamentally misappre-
hends congressional intent underlying section 12(2), as well as
the purpose of the statute when construed as a whole.
This Article examines the fundamental weaknesses of the rea-
soning underlying these recent decisions and concludes that the
section 12(2) cause of action is available to any defrauded buyer,
whether in the course of a primary distribution or in the second-
ary trading markets, who can satisfy the procedural prerequisites
of this express cause of action. Courts should use these procedural
restrictions, including the important concept of privity,10 to define
the availability and scope of this express cause of action, rather
than to imply a limitation that Congress intended the 1933 Act
to regulate only distribution transactions. The language of section
12(2) and its relationship to the other relevant provisions of the
federal securities laws, 1 as well as an examination of the legis-
lative histories of both the 1933 Act as a whole and section 12(2)
specifically, establish that a section 12(2) cause of action exists
for the defrauded buyer in the secondary markets.12 The courts
markets for distribution of securities into public hands and the markets for continuous
trading in outstanding securities."). The secondary markets also are often referred to as
the "trading markets" or "postdistribution markets."
10. Although Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), construed the concept of "seller" for
purposes of S 12(1), most courts since Pinter have used this definition for purposes of
defining the scope of S 12(2) liability. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1115
(5th Cir. 1988); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988).
11. The rubric of "federal securities laws" generally refers to seven statutes. Congress
enacted the first six statutes between 1933 and 1940: the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-77aa
(1988); the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 78a-78kk; the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. SS 79 to 79z-6; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, SS 301-328, 15 U.S.C. SS
77aaa-79bbbb; the Investment Company Act of 1940, SS 1-65, 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-
64; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, SS 201-222, 15 U.S.C. SS 80b-1 to 80b-21. Congress
enacted the seventh statute in 1970. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, SS 1(a)-
12, 15 U.S.C. SS 78aaa-781U4 see also 1934 Act S 21(g), 15 U.S.C. S 78c(a)(47) (as amended,
defining "securities laws" to include these seven acts).
12. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the starting point in any analysis
involving interpretation of a provision of the federal securities laws is the language of
the statute itself. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); Ernst
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therefore should not apply the section 12(2) remedy selectively
by implying a "bright line" test that neither the statute nor its
legislative history supports or even suggests.
Because the starting point of any analysis of the provisions of
the federal securities laws is the language of the statute itself,
Part I of this Article sets forth the elements of a section 12(2)
cause of action and concludes with an analysis of several hypo-
theticals showing how defrauded buyers may satisfy the elements
of section 12(2) in both distribution and trading market transac-
tions. Part II examines the legislative history of the 1933 Act as
a whole, and of section 12(2) specifically. Because the legislative
history does not squarely resolve the instant issue, Part II also
provides a contextual analysis of the provisions of section 12(2).
The purpose of this contextual analysis is to discern congressional
intent by looking at section 12(2)'s relationship to other provisions
of the statute. Part II also examines the reasoning of those courts
that have addressed the question of whether section 12(2) relief
is available to the defrauded secondary market buyer.13 Part HI
concludes that, consistent with the underlying purpose of the
statute, a section 12(2) cause of action is available to any de-
frauded buyer who otherwise satisfies the elements of a section
12(2) cause of action, including its built-in privity requirement.
I. ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 12(2) CAUSE OF ACTION
Except for the issue of who may be liable thereunder, there
is a paucity of case authority interpreting the requirements of
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976). The Court also looks to the legislative
history of the provision at issue, and of the statute as a whole, to ensure that the Court's
interpretation effectuates, and is consistent with, underlying congressional intent. See
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697-702 (1980); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-
77 (1979); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201-06. Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the federal securities laws and, in particular, the 1933 and 1934 Acts "constitute inter-
related components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securi-
ties ... . As [we] indicated in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 'the interdependence of
the various sections of the [federal] securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any
interpretation of the language Congress has chosen.' "Id. at 206 (quoting SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969)); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 387 (1983) (holding that an express remedy under the 1933 Act does not preclude a
cause of action under the 1934 Act). The Court thus often employs a contextual analysis
so as to give effect to each provision of the federal securities laws in a manner that is
consistent with, and that does not undermine, the other aspects of the federal securities
laws.
13. See supra note 7 (collecting citations to these cases).
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section 12(2). 14 Presumably, the arrested development of section
12(2) is attributable in large part to the rapid growth and ensuing
popularity of the implied cause of action under section 10(b) and
its rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act.15 Many commentators 16 predicted
a renewed interest in the section 12(2) remedy following the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,1'7
wherein the Court concluded that scienter was a required element
of the rule 10b-5 implied remedy.' The ruling in Hochfelder was
part of a line of decisions in which the Court seriously restricted
the availability of a private action under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5.19 Section 12(2) relief has been pursued more vigorously
since those decisions because, at least by comparison, section
12(2) "provides one of the most powerful but least appreciated
weapons" 20 at the plaintiffs' disposal.
The elements of an express cause of action under section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act are evident from the language of the statute.
Simply stated, the statute entitles the purchaser to rescission
from her seller (or in the event that the purchaser no longer
owns the security, to receive damages equivalent to rescission)
if the purchaser can establish that (1) the seller used interstate
commerce or the mails (2) to offer to sell or to sell a security to
the purchaser (3) by means of a prospectus or oral communication
(4) that misstated or omitted a material fact (5) of which the
purchaser did not have knowledge, unless (6) the seller sustains
the burden of proving that she did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission.2' A detailed examination of each of these elements
14. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 9, at 274; PLI, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE IN
SECURITIES REGULATION 807, 809, 815-33 (A. Fleischer, Jr. & M. Lipton, eds. 1977)
(comments of Professor Donald G. Schwartz).
15. 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1990). The SEC promulgated rule 10b-5 pursuant to S 10(b),
the antifraud provision of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. S 78j.
16. See Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How It
Compares with Rule lob-5, 13 Hous. L. REV. 231, 231 (1976); O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity
Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1983: The Expanded Meaning of Seller,
31 UCLA L. REV. 921, 927 (1984).
17. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
18. Id. at 206 (the plaintiff must show a mental state on the part of the defendant
embracing the intent to deceive, defraud, or manipulate).
19. See id. at 215-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); R. HADILTON, CORPORATIONS: CASES &
MATERIALS 944-48 (4th ed. 1990).
20. Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 231.
21. 15 U.S.C. S 77/(2) (1988). See generally Monetary Management Group, Inc. v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 615 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 253;
O'Hara, supra note 16, at 927 n.16 (enumerating the elements of a § 12(2) action).
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indicates that "section 12(2) on its face applies to the offer or
sale of any security," whether such purchase is made in the
primary or secondary market.22
A. Use of the Instruments of Interstate Commerce or of the
Mails
Section 12(2) specifically requires that the offer or sale be made
"by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails."' 3 Com-
mentators once vigorously debated the significance of the use of
the word "in," rather than the word "of," to precede "interstate
commerce," with some arguing that Congress may have intended
the word "in" to create a more restrictive scope for section
12(2).2 4 The prevalent view, however, emphasizes a very flexible
approach to this requirement. 25
Although a dearth of reported cases under section 12(2) deal
specifically with the jurisdictional issue of interstate commerce,
commentators generally agree "that the misrepresentation itself
need not have been made in interstate commerce; the jurisdic-
tional requirement is satisfied if the mails or interstate commerce
were utilized for any part of the transaction." 26 In deciding
whether a plaintiff has satisfied this aspect, courts generally look
to the entire transaction, not to its isolated parts. 7
Most of the cases have focused on the use of the mails because
generally that is easier for the plaintiff to prove. A growing body
of decisional law, however, relies on use of the telephone to
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 12(2), with some
courts arguing that a purely intrastate phone call will not suffice.2s
Nevertheless, the "more common and better reasoned view is
that any use, interstate or intrastate, of the telephone or tele-
22. O'Hara, supra note 16, at 928-29 n.18 (emphasis added).
23. S 12(2), 15 U.S.C. S 77/(2).
24. See Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 240; see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note
9, at 1336-37 ("[Tlhe Eighth Circuit in a footnote seems to suggest that this difference in
language may distinguish a section 12 action from a Rule 10b-5 action . . .
25. Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 240.
26. See id. (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 240 n.43 and the cases collected therein. Indeed, the author provides
several interesting examples of just "how tangential the use of interstate commerce or
the mails can be" and yet still satisfy S 12(2)'s jurisdictional prerequisites. Id. at 241-42.
28. See, e.g., Franklin Say. Bank v. Levy, 406 F. Supp. 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Heyman
v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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graph in the transaction will suffice." 9 The flexible interpretation
of the jurisdictional requirements of section 12(2), as reflected in
the case law, is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's oft-
repeated instruction that federal "securities laws combating fraud
should be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.' "30
B. The Privity Requirement: Offer or Sale of a Security to the
Purchaser
The plaintiff must show that she was a purchaser in an "offer
or sale" of a security. Because the rescission remedy of section
12(2) is generally available only to purchasers, misleading offers
not followed by purchases do ,not create liability under section
1202.31
The term "sale" is defined in section 2(3) of the 1933 Act.32 As
the courts have interpreted it, this term now embraces many
different types of transactions and is not limited strictly to a
sale of goods. For example, the original issuance of securities,
conventionally referred to as "a distribution transaction,"3' clearly
is a "sale" under this definition. Courts, however, have treated
many transactions occurring in the secondary markets, including
mergers, exchanges of stock, and pledges of stocks, as sales
under this definition 4 Once again, general agreement exists that
a broad interpretation of this term is consistent with the remedial
policies underlying the 1933 Act.35 This interpretation of "sale"
29. See Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 243; see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note
9, at 1336-37, especially the cases collected at n.10.
30. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1982) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)); see also Kaminsky, supra
note 16, at 243.
31. See Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 253; 1 T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 314 (2d ed. 1990). An offeree who does not purchase therefore cannot recover
under § 12(2), even though the seller lied to or deceived her through misrepresentations
or omissions as part of the seller's solicitation of buying interest. Should such an offeree
purchase, however, she would then have a cause of action for the deceptive "offer to
sell" and could seek rescission of the purchase under S 12(2). See L. Loss, supra note 3,
at 1025.
32. 15 U.S.C. S 77b(3) (1988). See generally Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 254 nn.111-14,
for a collection of cases defining the term "sale."
33. See supra note 9 (defining "distribution market").
34. See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1981) (pledge of securities is
a sale). Mergers and other forms of business combinations are treated as sales under the
SEC's rule 145. 17 C.F.R. S 230.145 (1990).
35. See Rubin, 449 U.S. at 431; Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 254. Nothing in the language
1991] 853
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is consistent with the view that defrauded buyers on the second-
ary markets may recover under section 12(2).
One of the most litigated aspects of section 12(2) has been the
question of who may be sued. Courts generally confer seller
status on the party who transfers title or other interest in the
security for value.36 Many courts have consistently relied on this
narrow interpretation of section 12(2) and have limited liability
strictly to the immediate seller.37 Some lower courts, particularly
the Fifth Circuit, however, have applied a "proximate cause-
substantial factor" approach to expand the liability of nontrans-
feror participants.s Courts adopting this theory imposed section
12 liability not only on the actual transferor of the security, but
also on any person "whose participation in the buy-sell transaction
is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place. '39
This broad definition of "seller" allowed plaintiffs to bring section
12(2) suits against a broad spectrum of "participants," including
lawyers and accountants who assisted in the preparation of
disclosure documents and other selling literature prepared for
dissemination to prospective buyers.40
of § 12(2) precludes its availability to secondary market transactions, assuming the
defrauded buyers satisfy the other statutory requirements. Indeed, affording S 12(2) relief
to defrauded buyers in the secondary market is likewise "consistent with the remedial
policy" underlying the 1933 Act. See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
36. See Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1983:
"Participation" and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 877, 878
(1987).
37. See, e.g., Collins v. Signetic Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1979); Benoay v.
Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 494 (ED. Mich. 1981); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 452
F. Supp. 812, 814 (ED. Pa. 1978); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1091-
93 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Section 15 of the 1933 Act imposes secondary liability on a person who controls a
party found liable under S 12. 15 U.S.C. S 77o (1988). Courts may use this concept of
"control person liability" to expand the category of persons who may be held liable under
S 12(2) beyond those in direct privity with the plaintiff. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3840 (1969 Supp.); Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80, 80 n.4 (1981). Another basis for expanding
the scope of potential § 12 defendants is to rely on secondary liability theories of aiding
and abetting and conspiracy to reach collateral participants in a sale. See generally O'Hara,
supra note 16, at 979-86; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 597, 620-45 (1972). These theories of secondary liability for § 12(2) violations
lie outside the scope of this Article.
38. See Abrams, supra note 36, at 878, 887-94.
39. Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 486 U.S.
622 (1988).
40. See 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 322-24, 325 nn.21-29 and the cases collected
therein.
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This growing line of cases produced widely divergent results
depending on the court's specific definition of "seller."41 The
expansive definition of "seller" evoked sharp criticism from com-
mentators, who complained, among other things, that the courts'
decisions were not consistent with the statutory language of
section 12, nor with its legislative history.42 Finally, in June 1988,
the Supreme Court decided Pinter v. Dahi" and rejected the
lower courts' expansive formulation of the privity requirement."
In Pinter, the Court construed the definition of "seller" for
purposes of section 12(1) and carefully limited its opinion accord-
ingly.45 Many of the cases that the Court discussed, however,
were primarily section 12(2) cases. Moreover, the relevant lan-
guage of both subsections is substantially identical, suggesting
that the same definition of "seller" should apply to both. Indeed,
both the Second and Fifth Circuits have recently held that the
Pinter standard applies to section 12(2) claims.46
41. One author described these judicial developments as follows:
Three different lines of authority emerge in these [cases expanding the
concept of who may be a "seller"]. In defining the parameters of who may
be primarily liable as a seller under section 12(2), some courts adopt a rather
ambiguous test geared to a collateral party's participation in the events
leading up to the sale in question. The Fifth Circuit has rejected this
participation test as overly broad and has developed a proximate cause
analysis. Under this theory only those collateral parties whose participation
is a substantial factor in causing a transaction to take place may be liable
as sellers under section 12(2). The Eighth Circuit has rejected the proximate
cause analysis and developed a third approach. Stating that the Fifth Circuit's
test fails to adequately implement the underlying policies of the Securities
Act, the Eighth Circuit held in Wasson v. SEC that the pivotal consideration
should be "whether the defendant was uniquely positioned to ask relevant
questions, acquire material information, or disclose his findings."
Each of these tests grapples with the problem of determining what
relationship a collateral participant must bear to the sales transaction in
order to justify imposing primary liability under section 12.
O'Hara, supra note 16, at 947 (footnotes omitted).
42. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 36, at 878-79; O'Hara, supra note 16, at 933.
43. 486 U.S. 622 (1988). Pinter was an oil and gas producer and a registered securities
broker/dealer. Id. at 625. He sold fractional undivided interests in oil and gas leases to
Dahl, a real estate broker, who had previously invested in oil and gas ventures. Id. Dahl
in turn "touted the properties," id., to his family, friends, and other business associates.
Id. at 625 n.1. Eleven of these persons invested in the venture and each paid $7,500 for
the unregistered securities. Id. at 626. Dahl "assisted [them] in completing subscription
agreement forms prepared by Pinter . . . . [but] received no commission from Pinter
when each of them invested in unregistered interests on the basis of Dahi's involvement."
Id.
44. Id. at 647-54.
45. See d. at 642 n.20 (in which the Court expressly declined to rule on the standard
to be used for S 12(2) purposes).
46. See Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
858 F.2d 1104, 1113-15 (5th Cir. 1988); H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 9, at 282-83.
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In a seven-to-one decision,47 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, acknowledged that only a defendant "from" whom the
plaintiff "purchased" the securities may be liable.48 Although
section 12(1) liability clearly attaches to the owner who passes
title or other interest in the security for value, the Court declined
to read this language to mean that section 12(1) liability attaches
exclusively to the owner from whom the plaintiff "purchased"
the security.49 The Court recognized that a person "may offer or
sell property without necessarily being the person who transfers
title"5° and, in support of this point, cited section 2(3) of the 1933
Act, which defines the term "offer" to include the "solicitation
of an offer to buy."5' Relying primarily on this language, the
Court found that solicitation activity by individuals other than
the actual owner can constitute the basis for section 12(1) liability
because solicitation involves "an activity not inherently confined
to the actual owner" of the security. 2 Moreover,
[t]he solicitation of a buyer is perhaps the most critical stage
of the selling transaction .... In addition, brokers and other
solicitors are well positioned to control the flow of information
to a potential purchaser, and, in fact, such persons are the
participants in the selling transaction who most often dissem-
inate material information to investors.53
Consistent with lower court authority, the Supreme Court,
however, was reluctant to impose liability for "mere gregarious-
ness"; it stressed that "gratuitous advice, no matter how enthu-
siastic, is not actionable under section 12(1). If one is merely
assisting the buyer it would be 'uncommon to say' that the
securities were purchased from him or that he was soliciting."54
The Court therefore held that before classifying someone as a
seller, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's activity "was
motivated at least in part by a desire to further his own financial
interests or those of the securities owner."55 Under this formu-
47. Justice Stevens dissented and Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision.
48. See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 643-44.
49. See id. at 644-45 (rejecting Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979)).
50. Id. at 642.
51. S 2(3), 15 U.S.C. S 77b(3) (1988).
52. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 643.
53. Id. at 646.
54. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 9, at 281.
55. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647. The Court, however, was unable to determine whether the
defendant in the case at bar was a seller under the standard adopted in its opinion.
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lation, a defendant's indirect involvement in the selling process
should not give rise to section 12(1) liability.5
In establishing this formulation, the Court relied heavily on
section 12(1)'s relationship to other provisions of the 1933 Act,
as well as to the underlying purpose of the 1933 Act as articulated
by Congress.57 This decisional strategy in Pinter strongly sug-
gests that the correct approach to deciding whether to apply
section 12(2) to fraudulent postdistribution trading is to look first
to the precise language of section 12(2) and to interpret that
language in light of other relevant provisions of the 1933 Act,
including section 2, the definitional section. Thus, the reasoning
of those courts that deny section 12(2) relief to the defrauded
secondary market purchaser's is fundamentally flawed because
they fail to consider fully the statutory language of section 12(2)
or the section 2 definitions of terms used in section 12(2).
The opinion in Pinter casts further doubt on the reasoning of
these courts because the standard of "seller" that the Court
established focuses on the defendant's relationship to the buyer
rather than on the defendant's relationship to the transaction.5 9
The district court opinions denying section 12(2) relief, on the
other hand, have focused on the nature of the transaction, that
is, whether plaintiff's purchase was part of a distribution trans-
action or a secondary market transaction, an approach that is
inconsistent with the analytical approach adopted by the Court
in Pinter.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the Pinter case for a determination of whether the
defendant urged the purchaser to complete the transaction to further either his own or
the seller's financial interests. Id. at 655.
56. 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 322.
It is clear that someone whose involvement consists merely of preparation
of the registration statement or offering materials will not be classified as
a seller under section 12. An attorney's participation in preparing the offering
materials will not render him or her a section 12 seller. An accountant's
participation in the offering materials, without more, is equally insufficient
to establish Section 12 liability .... Many of the cases imposing liability on
accountants, attorneys, and underwriters were decided prior to Pinter v.
Dah ....
Id. at 323-24 (footnotes omitted).
57. "The soundest interpretation of the term ['purchase', as used in S 12, . . . is as a
correlative to both 'sell' and 'offer,' at least to the extent that the latter entails active
solicitation of an offer to buy." Pinter, 486 U.S. at 645. "This [approach] is in accordance
with the underlying policies of Section 12(1) to impose strict liability and provide an in
terrorem remedy which encourages compliance with the registration provisions in order
to promote full and fair disclosure." H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 9, at 280.
58. See, e.g., Ralph v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1322, 1325 (S.D. Fla.
1988); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
59. See 1 T. HAzEN, supra note 31, at 324-25.
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C. By Means of a "Prospectus" or Oral Communication
The seller must have engaged in fraudulent conduct by means
of a prospectus or oral communication to be liable under section
12(2).60 Oral communications that omit a material fact or that
misrepresent a material fact give rise to liability under section
12(2)M1 By including the term "prospectus," section 12(2) also
takes aim at any "writing" used to misrepresent or mislead.6 2
Consistent with the approach used by the Court in Pinter in
construing the term "seller" in section 12, the starting point of
the analysis under section 12(2) is to examine the statutory
definition of the term "prospectus." As defined in section 2(10)
of the 1933 Act, "prospectus" includes "any notice, circular,
advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or
television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale
of any security."' Congress defined this term very broadly, so
as to capture almost any written communication that can be said
to "offer" a security for sale, no matter what form it may take.64
As envisioned by Congress, the section 2(10) "prospectus" defi-
nition obviously includes the traditional offering circular prepared
in connection with registered distribution transactions, 6 as well
as other, perhaps more unusual writings that market participants
may use to solicit investor interest, such as research reports,
letters, or sales brochures.6
In addition to identifying the means by which the fraudulent
conduct must occur, some defendants have used the section 12(2)
phrase "by means of prospectus or oral communication" as the
basis for alleging a reliance requirement as part of the plaintiff's
case-in-chief.67 In one well-known section 12(2) case, Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co.,68 the court concluded that this phrase simply
60. See S 12(2), 15 U.S.C. S 771(2) (1988).
61. See id.; text accompanying note 21.
62. Id.
63. 15 U.S.C. S 77b(10).
64. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 119.
65. The traditional offering circular prepared for use in the context of registered
distribution transactions is, in common parlance, the prospectus, which is filed with the
SEC as Part I of the registration statement.
66. See, e.g., Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 873 (2d Cir. 1971) (in which the
issuer sent a letter along with the prospectus to investors, apparently in an effort to
pique their interest).
67. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
68. 619 F.2d 1222.
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required the plaintiff to show that the prospectus or writing
involved in that case, a commercial paper report, contained mis-
leading statements of material fact. 9 The court therefore over-
ruled the defendants' attempt to use this language to inject a
reliance requirement into section 12(2) 7 The defendants in that
case had urged the court to permit only those investors who
received the misleading report to bring a section 12(2) cause of
action.7' The court rejected this position on the grounds that
such a position would import into section 12(2) a reliance require-
ment in clear contravention of congressional intent to liberalize
the common law rescission cause of action as part of its overall
policy of enhancing investor protection.72 Several commentators
have expressed similar views:
The theory is that section 12(2) is designed to put the burden
of responsibility upon those who would induce public reliance
in the securities markets, namely, the sellers of securities. To
accomplish this policy, it is reasoned that the purchaser should
be relieved of all proof of reliance, and consistent with this
policy, the purchaser need not prove causation either.73
D. Misstatement or Omission of a "Material" Fact
To recover under section 12(2), the purchaser must show that
the seller misrepresented or omitted a "material fact" in a pro-
spectus or oral communication. 74 Today, the relevant test for
materiality is whether "there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable [investor] would consider it important in deciding"
whether to purchase the security.7 5 Although this definition of
69. Id. at 1227.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1225.
72. Id. at 1226.
73. Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 264-65 (footnotes omitted); accord L. Loss, supra note
3, at 1024-25.
74. See text accompanying note 21.
75. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Although the Court originally
formulated this definition in the context of a rule 14a-9 implied cause of action for
violations of the proxy solicitation rules, courts have generally followed it in interpreting
the concept of "materiality" under other provisions of the federal securities laws. See
Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying
TSC standard of materiality to 5 12(2) suit); L. Loss, supra note 3, at 550 (the TSC
Industries "definition of 'material' has been followed (mutatis mutandis) in other SEC
contexts"); see also Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. S 230.405 (defining "materiality" under the 1933
Act as "those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security").
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"materiality" may suggest a showing of some form of causation,
it does not require a showing of actual causation. 76 Consequently,
the only causation requirement that is part of the plaintiff's
burden under section 12(2) is the element of reliance, or causation,
that "is inherent in the concept of materiality."77
Moreover, the plaintiff need prove only one material misrep-
resentation or omission to recover; the plaintiff is not required
to prove all of the misrepresentations or omissions that she may
plead in her complaint.78 Finally, the question of materiality is a
fact question for the jury to resolve. In certain situations, how-
ever, materiality may be so obvious that the court can resolve
the issue as a matter of law.79
E. Lack of Knowledge by the Purchaser
The only duty that section 12(2) imposes on the plaintiff as
part of her case-in-chief is to show that, as of the time of sale,
she did not know of the alleged misrepresentations or omissions. 80
The section 12(2) cause of action places no duty of investigation
on the purchaser; the duty to investigate, if any, falls exclusively
on the seller.8' Accordingly, the section 12(2) plaintiff need not
76. See Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 258.
77. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1024; see also Kaminsky, supra note 16 at 258 (the reliance
requirement is an objective standard df the "reasonable" investor). The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit made this conclusion explicit in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,
619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981), wherein the court held
that plaintiffs in an action based on S 12(2) do not have to establish reliance. Id. at 1225.
Plaintiffs do not necessarily have to establish, therefore, that they received or read the
defective writings (in Sanders, the commercial paper reports). Id. Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit in Sanders also held it sufficient that a prospectus containing misleading state-
ments was distributed to some of the purchasers. Id. at 1227. To require, as defendant
argued, that only those who received the report could recover under S 12(2) would, in
effect, require reliance. Id. at 1225-26.
78. Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 262.
79. Id. In this regard, one should also note that the plaintiff must prove that the seller
misrepresented or omitted a material 'Ifact." In deciding whether a disputed piece of
information is a fact, courts frequently distinguish between "hard" facts, "meaning
statements concerning objectively verifiable historical events or situations," and "soft
information," which generally includes "forward looking statements such as projections,
predictions and statements concerning future expectations:' New Approaches to Disclosure
in Registered Security Offerings-A Panel Discussion, 28 Bus. LAW. 505, 506 (1973) (remarks
of Carl Schneider); see also 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 317 ("Broadly generalized
opinions may not be actionable under section 12(2) to the extent that a certain amount
of puffery is permissible." Soft information thus must be further distinguished from
"mere puffery.").
80. See Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 266.
81. See, e.g., Sanders, 619 F.2d at 1224; Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 266.
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prove that she could not have learned the true facts had she
exercised reasonable diligence prior to purchasing.82
As one court suggested, "Availability elsewhere of truthful
information cannot excuse untruths or misleading omissions" by
the seller.P Courts, therefore, generally reject any defense based
upon common law concepts of the purchaser/plaintiff's "contrib-
utory negligence" or "assumption of risk."' The only available
defense under section 12(2) based on the conduct of the purchaser
is that the purchaser was aware of the misstated or omitted
fact.a' Similarly, the claim that the plaintiff is a sophisticated
investor will not bar recovery and does not lessen the duty of
disclosure that the seller/defendant owes to the purchaser.86 "A
82. In this respect, S 12(2), a modified rescission cause of action, may be more advan-
tageous to the plaintiff/purchaser than a rule 10b-5 fraud cause of action. See Kaminsky,
supra note 16, at 266-67. Courts may deem the rule 10b-5 plaintiff to have "constructive"
knowledge based upon facts that were readily available to him. To avoid a finding of
constructive knowledge, many courts require the rule 10b-5 plaintiff to show that she
used reasonable diligence to learn the material facts. See id. at 267 nn.167-68 and cases
cited therein.
83. Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 885, 858 (2d Cir. 1956).
84. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1010 n.12, 1024; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Joste,
323 F. Supp. 843, 847 (W.D. La. 1970).
85. Whether and to what extent the purchaser will be deemed to know allegedly
"public" information remains an open question under S 12(2). Many rule 10b-
5 cases have held that the defendant need not disclose facts which he
reasonably believes the plaintiff already knows, specifically including those
which are publicly available, but the defendant must have had reasonable
grounds for believing that disclosure from him was unnecessary.
Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 272 (footnotes omitted).
Any attempt to impute a constructive knowledge component in a S 12(2) action, however,
may be inconsistent with Congress' apparent intent that S 12(2) shift the duty of
investigation to the seller to encourage the seller to make full disclosure. Id. at 273. On
the other hand,
a plaintiff may fairly be deemed to know some broadly publicized facts based
upon the extent of their publication and the purchaser's own habits of
investigation, such as reading periodicals or newspapers, or listening to the
radio or watching television. But the burden should be placed decidedly on
the defendant to show both that the purchaser had easy and ready access
to the precise information and that the seller knew or had very good reason
to believe that the purchaser was actually looking into the matter or would
learn of such information on his own.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-66 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In any event, the public availability of
the information need not be part of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, but should be part of the
seller's burden. To do otherwise would be to contravene the shifting of the burden of
proof that Congress set forth in § 12(2). See infra notes 88-101 and accompanying text
discussing seller's affirmative defense of reasonable care.
86. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
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seller cannot cheat a person merely because he or she is rich
and intelligent."87
F. Seller's Lack of Knowledge and "Reasonable Care"
The only affirmative defense available to the seller in a section
12(2) suit requires the seller to prove not only that she did not
know about the untruth or omissions, but also that she could not
have learned the truth by the exercise of reasonable care.e The
fact that the defendant may have acted honestly and in good
faith is irrelevant if, with reasonable diligence, the seller could
have discovered the truth.8 9 Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved
in establishing this affirmative defense is to define the scope of
the seller's reasonable diligence burden. The leading case ad-
dressing this question under section 12(2) is Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co0
In Sanders, the defendant acted as an underwriter of commer-
cial paper for a finance company, which the defendant placed in
exempt transactions with forty-two purchasers.9' With the coop-
eration of its auditors, the issuer of the commercial paper had
engaged in a deliberate fraud by overstating its receivables by
87. Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 268.
88. This involves proving not only a negative fact, but also a negative hypo-
thetical possibility, a decidedly difficult task.
The seller's task is difficult but not impossible. In many respects the
seller's task of proving that he did not know is similar to that which the
purchaser bears under S 12(2). There is, however, one significant difference:
there appears to be no reason not to impute constructive knowledge to the
seller. Indeed, he is deemed to know anything he could readily have learned.
Proving that he could not have known, had he exercised reasonable diligence,
is even more difficult. In that regard, what constitutes "reasonable diligence"
would appear to be determined by reference to the common law meaning of
that term.
Id. at 275.
89. See id. at 277. In addition to the S 12(2) affirmative defense of "reasonable care,"
a short statute of limitations applies to 5 12(2) actions. See Securities Act of 1933, S 13,
15 U.S.C. S 77m (1988). The seller also may try to establish that the purchaser actually
knew the misrepresented or omitted facts or that the facts were not material. Additionally,
the defendant could attack certain jurisdictional prerequisites, such as whether the
instrument purchased was a "security" or whether the facilities of interstate commerce
or the mails were used as part of the transaction at issue.
Other defenses may be available to the seller, including waiver and estoppel. Courts,
however, must be vigilant so that these defenses do not improperly negate the prudent
rule that contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are not defenses under
S 12(2). See Kaminsky, supra note 16, at 279.
90. 619 F.2d 1222.
91. Id. at 1224.
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approximately $14 million and understating its indebtedness by
approximately $1.7 million.9 The defendant/underwriter, unaware
of the issuer's fraud, distributed misleading "commercial paper
reports" based on the issuer's data to some purchasers and made
misleading oral statements to other purchasers 3 A large number
of the purchasers, however, had neither received nor read the
reports, and the broker/dealer firm had made no specific repre-
sentation to them.94
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
found the defendant/underwriter firm liable 5 In so ruling, the
court turned to section 11 of the 1933 Act to help define the
scope of "reasonable care" under section 12(2). The two sections,
however, appear to set out different standards. Section 12(2)
imposes liability on a defendant who fails to establish that she
used "reasonable care," whereas section 11 expressly requires
certain defendants, as part of the due diligence defense, to prove
they made a "reasonable investigation."' ' Despite these differ-
ences in statutory language, the Seventh Circuit decided that
section 12(2) did not differ from section 11 with respect to the
defense of an underwriter.P In emphasizing the underwriter's
role, the Seventh Circuit decided that such a seller must make a
reasonable investigation to establish that she used reasonable
care for purposes of her section 12(2) defense.9 With respect to
other types of sellers sued under section 12(2), "a reasonable
investigation may or may not be necessary in order to establish
reasonable care depending on their role and the circumstances."'00
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1224-25.
95. Id. at 1229.




100. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 9, at 276-77.
[Another] disturbing aspect of the [Sanders] decision is the reliance on Section
11 precedents to impose liability on the underwriter [defendant] without
regard to the distinction between expertised and non-expertised represen-
tations. The duty to make a reasonable investigation under Section 11 for
the nonexpert is limited to the nonexpertised portion of a registration
statement. With respect to the liability of such persons for expertised
representations, there is no requirement that they have made a reasonable
investigation.
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The precise standard for determining the seller's exercise of
reasonable care, including any requirement that the seller make
a "reasonable investigation," remains unclear.101 Nonetheless, the
Seventh Circuit's emphasis on the selling underwriter's obligation
to make a reasonable investigation is consistent with the appli-
cation of the section 12(2) remedy to the trading markets. The
nature of the seller and her relationship to the purchaser, which
was the focus of the analysis in Pinter, are likewise the proper
focus for determining the scope of the seller's burden in estab-
lishing the defense of "reasonable care." The the remainder of
Part I of this Article emphasizes this point in its analysis of the
applicability of the elements of section 12(2) to several hypothet-
ical trading situations.
G. Applying Section 12(2) Elements to Fraudulent
Postdistribution Trading: Examples
In Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, In., 10 2 the plaintiff/
investor group brought a section 12(2) suit against the defendant/
brokerage firm, Legg Mason, alleging that the firm had solicited
each of the plaintiffs to purchase stock in Wickes by means of
oral misrepresentations s concerning the book value of the pur-
101. See John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981) (denial of certiorari).
Justice Powell's opinion dissenting from the Court's decision to deny review in Sanders
reflects this uncertainty: "Although the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not explicit,
it appears to impose a duty of 'reasonable investigation' rather than S 12 (2)'s requirement
of 'reasonable care.'" Id. at 1008 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102. No. 88-6867 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), rev'd, 925
F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 2-3. In another case involving oral misrepresentations, the court construed
the phrase "oral communications" as used in S 12(2) to permit the defrauded secondary
market buyer to bring a S 12(2) action. Elysian Fed. Sav. Bank v. First Interregional
Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737, 749-51 (D.N.J. 1989). In so ruling, the court observed:
It is basically inclusion of the word "prospectus" in Section 12(2) (which is
not included in Section 17(a), the Securities Act provision held applicable in
the secondary market context) which defendants argue supplies the basis
for reading the statute narrowly. Apart from the fact that the Third Circuit
in Data Access emphasized the broad remedial purposes of the Securities
Act (to "provide full and fair disclosure" in connection with interstate
securities sales), defendants' precise and well-refined analysis of certain
words in the statute (or the absence of them), although thought provoking,
does not compel the conclusion Section 12(2) was meant to apply only in
connection with new securities offerings.
If, on the other hand, Section 12(2) referred to a person who "offers a
security by means of a prospectus or related oral communication," it would
be more clear the statute was not intended to apply to aftermarket trans-
actions. Instead, Section 12(2) refers to the act of a person who "offers or
sells" a security by means of a "prospectus or oral communication."
Id. at 750 (footnotes omitted).
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chased securities. The parties agreed that the defendant sold a
security to the plaintiff by means of an oral communication that
misstated or omitted a material fact of which the plaintiff/pur-
chaser did not have knowledge.10 4 In this case, the brokerage
firm used the facilities of interstate commerce, the mails, to
describe material facts about Wickes stock- specifically, the book
value-in a misleading fashion, and the purchaser had no knowl-
edge of the disputed facts.10 5 Moreover, the defendant/brokerage
firm was unable to establish that it did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care, could not have known, of the mis-
statement or omission.'O This postdistribution trading transaction
therefore satisfied all of the statutory prerequisites of a section
12(2) action.1
One of the more hotly contested aspects of this case involved
whether the defendant/brokerage firm was a seller for purposes
of section 12(2).108 The district court found that the Supreme
Court in Pinter v. Dahi had overruled the Third Circuit's strict
privity requirement under section 12.10 The court in Ballay
further found that the definition of "seller" in Pinter would apply
to actions brought under section 12(2) on the grounds that "most
authorities [conclude] that the language of sections 12(1) and 12(2)
is identical in meaning,"" 0 thus overruling defendant's claim that
the analysis in Pinter is limited to claims under section 12(1).
The court found that on the facts as established at trial, the
defendant/brokerage firm successfully solicited plaintiffs' pur-
chases of Wickes stock, "motivated at least in part by a desire
to serve its own financial interests.""' This case demonstrates
that nothing in the definition of "seller" in Pinter precludes its
application to fraudulent sales activity by market professionals
in connection with postdistribution trading.112
104. Ba aly, No. 88-6867 at 6 n.2.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 3.
107. I& at 1-4.
108. Id. at 7-9.
109. I& at 7-10.
110. Id. at 8.
111. I& (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988)).
112. Indeed, most commentators agree that brokerldealers are the most likely group
of prospective defendants to be included within the definition of "seller" in Pinter. See,
e.g., 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 325 ("Sales agents, however, such as brokers, are now
likely to become the main targets of section 12 liability beyond actual purveyors of title,
since often the broker conducts the sale.").
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Clearly, these facts as found by the jury"3 satisfy the elements
of an express cause of action under section 12(2). One should also
note that the plaintiffs in Ballay prevailed in a suit against a
brokerage firm, a securities professional. This fact presumably is
important in establishing the standard of care that the brokerage
firm owed to the purchasers. The few cases addressing the
affirmative defense of reasonable care suggest that a different
standard may apply depending upon the nature of the defendant
and other attendant circumstances.1 4 In Ballay, the brokerage
firm was a seller because it successfully solicited plaintiffs' pur-
chases and was motivated, at least in part, by its own financial
interests, presumably receipt of a commission on the trade." 5 To
the extent the brokerage firm, as a securities professional, makes
representations about the worth of the security, that firm has
the obligation to be truthful, and under section 12(2) it has the
further obligation to exercise reasonable care in making any such
representations. 16 Therefore, before a broker can make affirma-
tive statements about the securities in question, she clearly has
some obligation to investigate and ascertain the accuracy of any
statements she would use to solicit prospective buyers' interest
in the securities. The scope of this affirmative investigation
responsibility is peculiarly a fact-driven inquiry that depends, at
least in part, on issues such as the brokerage firm's relationship
with the issuer, the extent of the broker's knowledge of the
issuer's affairs, and what the broker wants to say to solicit
investor interest."7
But what of the seller who is sued under section 12(2) but who
is not a broker/dealer or other type of market professional?"
113. This case went to trial and the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on their 5 12(2)
claims. Ballay, No. 88-6867 at 3-4. Additionally, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
defendants and against plaintiffs on their rule 10b-5 claims. Id. Presumably then, the
plaintiffs brought suit within the relevant time periods specified in S 13 (setting forth
the statute of limitations for 5 12(2) claims). See supra note 89. Also, this jury verdict is
consistent with the opinion of those commentators who predicted increased reliance on
§ 12(2) following the Supreme Court decision in Hochfelder, which required rule 10b-5
plaintiffs to carry the higher burden of proving scienter. Section 12(2), by contrast, shifts
the burden to the defendant to establish that it acted with "reasonable care."
114. See, e.g., supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
115. Balay, No. 88-6867 at 7-9.
116. Id.
117. See 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 316-17.
118. As another example, the brokerage firm in Ballay may have acted as a principal
and sold Wickes stock out of inventory to plaintiffs. In such a case, Legg Mason would
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For example, in the context of the fact situation in Bcxlay, assume
that Legg Mason acted as a broker and sold stock ou behalf of
its client, an anonymous seller. The seller, as transferor of title,
did not make any misleading statements to the plaintiff/purchas-
ers. The seller's broker, Legg Mason, thus exclusively committed
the wrongful conduct, which in this case consisted of material
misstatements about the book value of Wickes stock. Further
assume that the seller was a nonaffiliate of Wickes and a non-
securities professional. She was simply an ordinary investor using
the services of a broker/dealer to access the securities markets
to dispose of her investment. In such a case, the ordinary investor
acting as a seller should have a much easier time proving the
section 12(2) affirmative defense of reasonable care. An ordinary,
nonaffiliate investor is presumably held to a much lower standard
of care than that required of Legg Mason as a securities profes-
sional. Under this more relaxed standard of care, the ordinary
investor presumably would simply show that she took no affir-
mative steps to deceive the buyer, such as concealing material
facts known to her. No further affirmative investigation of the
issuer or its securities would be required of this nonaffiliate,
nonsecurities professional seller to establish that she acted with
reasonable care.
What of the situation in which the ordinary investor/nonaffiliate
seller in a face-to-face transaction is aware of facts sufficient to
put her on notice that further investigation may be warranted?
Under section 12(2) decisional law, it appears that a securities
professional, such as a brokerage firm like Legg Mason, would
have a duty to investigate-that is, to make inquiries of the
have been the seller in the classic sense by virtue of being the transferor of title. Because
the court had to apply the analysis in Pinter, however, to decide whether it could properly
consider Legg Mason a seller in a § 12(2) suit, the court's analysis suggests that Legg
Mason could have been acting in a broker capacity and could have sold to plaintiffs
Wickes stock that was owned by some third party, perhaps another customer of Legg
Mason. In this case, it appears that plaintiffs did not sue the transferors of the Wickes
stock, who, as the actual owners, would clearly be sellers under the analysis in Pinter.
Assuming this was the case in Balay, one must ask why the plaintiffs brought their case
to trial against only the brokerage firm. Analysis of this question necessarily involves
the seller's S 12(2) affirmative defense of reasonable care. This same situation also may
arise in the context of a direct sale between buyer and seller without the services of a
broker as a financial intermediary. In such a case, presumably, no dispute would exist
as to whether the defendantlowner is a seller because the defendant is also the actual
transferor of title. Nevertheless, one may raise the same question as to the standard
that the seller, as a nonsecurities professional, must satisfy to prove his or her affirmative
defense of reasonable care under S 12(2).
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relevant parties such as the issuer, to ascertain the material
facts, and to make adequate disclosure of such information to the
prospective buyer. By contrast, the case law is sparse as to the
scope of investigation and disclosure required of the ordinary
investor who is not a securities professional. The case law inter-
preting the level of care required to establish the section 12(2)
affirmative defense generally speaks in terms of a sliding scale
standard depending upon all of the facts and circumstances.119
Thus, the ordinary investor under section 12(2) should at most
be required to disclose to the prospective buyer any suspicious
facts and circumstances known to the seller/ordinary investor.
The buyer can then decide whether further investigation is
warranted and whether to make appropriate adjustments in the
purchase price to reflect these additional costs.
To require this nonaffiliate, nonsecurities professional seller to
undertake an affirmative investigation simply because she is
aware of suspicious facts seems inconsistent with the legislative
purpose underlying the section 12(2) defense. By shifting proof
of scienter to the seller as an affirmative defense under section
12(2), Congress intended to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof.21
Congress believed that the defendant/seller, as the party gener-
ally closer to the relevant facts, would be in an easier position
to prove her innocence than the plaintiff, who otherwise would
have to undertake extensive discovery to ascertain facts neces-
sary to establish the defendant's state of mind.12 1 Congress clearly
intended to modify common law causes of action to remove proof
of scienter from plaintiff's case-in-chief. No evidence suggests,
however, that Congress intended by this shifting burden of proof
to hold all sellers to the same standard of care in proving their
affirmative defense of reasonable care. Existing case law, al-
though limited, does suggest that courts are to interpret "rea-
sonable care" in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the
particular situation, including the nature of the defendant/seller?2
Presumably common law principles can support a flexible stan-
dard that gives appropriate weight to the nature of the seller-
such as an affiliate of the issuer, a securities professional, or an
119. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text (discussing current authority inter-
preting the § 12(2) reasonable care standard).
120. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
121. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1026.
122. See id. at 1028-29; 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 316-17.
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ordinary investor-and to adjust the required standard of care
accordingly1 23
The foregoing discussion of seller liability under section 12(2)
has focused on face-to-face transactions between buyer and seller;
but what about the open market buyer who purchases the se-
curity in an anonymous exchange or over-the-counter transaction?
In these cases, the privity requirement again will substantially
narrow the availability of section 12(2) relief.124 The purchaser
can sue only Pinter-type sellers, who generally can be identified
through tracing, although the transaction costs may be prohibi-
tively high.12 In any case, once the buyer determines the identity
of the actual transferor, the buyer may rescind the transaction,
assuming that her seller made any misleading statement "by
means of a prospectus or oral communication.' 26 In the case of
many open-market transactions, the seller is an ordinary investor
disposing of her investment and has engaged in no actionable
misconduct in connection with her decision to sell. On the other
hand, a purchaser who can ultimately trace her seller to a market
professional may try to claim that the seller was aware of facts
123. Indeed, the proposed Federal Securities Code carries forward this suggestion. See
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1028-29 n.27 (quoting 5 1704(g) of the proposed Federal Securities
Code as promulgated by the American Law Institute. For a general description of this
monumental undertaking, see L. Loss, supra note 3, at 38-54). In any case, the precise
scope of the seller's obligation to make a reasonable investigation in order to establish
the S 12(2) reasonable care defense need not be defined to decide the more fundamental
issue of whether S 12(2) relief is available to any defrauded purchaser who otherwise
satisfies the procedural prerequisites of S 12(2). Further refinement of the scope of the
seller's reasonable care defense is outside the scope of this Article.
124. At least one commentator has already made this observation:
While S 12(2, like § 10(b) and rule lob-5, potentially applies to both primary
distributions and secondary resales, this Article advocates a return to a
relatively strict privity requirement for 5 12(2), and therefore impacts on
the ultimate availability of 5 12(2), as compared with rule 10b-5, which does
not require privity. For example, in a primary distribution undertaken
through a firm commitment underwriting, a strict privity approach to § 12(2)
limits each link in the distributive chain to a S 12(2) claim only against his
immediate seller .... Similarly, while S 12(2) can reach a secondary resale,
the privity requirement would undercut its availability in open market
purchases since it is usually impossible to trace the actual seller in such
transactions.
O'Hara, spra note 16, at 929 n.18 (citations omitted).
125. In most situations, recovery may be prohibitively expensive because "it is usually
impossible to trace the actual seller" in an open-market transaction. See id. Further,
these transaction costs may be excessive in light of the remedy available assuming the
buyer's suit is successful on the merits and the seller's reasonable care defense fails.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 60-73.
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that gave rise to an affirmative duty to investigate in order to
satisfy the section 12(2) defense of reasonable care. In most
situations, however, the plaintiff will face difficulty in establishing
this claim because the open-market seller, in the absence of truly
culpable conduct or acquiescence in wrongful nondisclosure, pre-
sumably made the decision to sell for independent reasons; her
conduct, therefore, has not otherwise deprived her of the section
12(2) defense of reasonable care. In any case, the built-in privity
requirement of section 12(2) has substantially narrowed the class
of potential defendants. 1'
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 12(2)
As illustrated above, nothing in the statute's text limits the
section 12(2) remedy only to distribution transactions. The cases
denying a section 12(2) cause of action for fraudulent postdistri-
bution trading, therefore, rely heavily on other "evidence" of
legislative intent to support their decision to deny section 12(2)
relief. Part II of this Article will demonstrate, however, that the
sparse legislative history on section 12(2) itself reflects that
Congress did not intend to limit the availability of this express
remedy only to distribution transactions. An analysis of the
relationship of section 12(2) to the other statutory provisions of
the 1933 Act,12 as well as to other express and implied remedies
127. As an alternative to relying on the privity requirement of § 12(2) to determine
its availability to a particular plaintiff, one commentator recently proposed to "amend
S 12(2) to apply only to those aftermarket transactions where the market for the security
is not efficient." Note, Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act to the Aftermarket, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 955, 975 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Applying Section 12(2) to the Aftermarket].
The better approach, however, is to incorporate efficient market principles into the
discussion of the level of care that any § 12(2) defendant/seller must show to prove her
affirmative defense. For example, if the securities sold are issued by a company eligible
to register on a Form S-3, the scope of investigation required of any seller (regardless
of whether the seller is a securities professional, or an affiliate of the issuer, or possesses
some other important distinguishing factor) may be very narrow because the issuer is
widely followed in the marketplace. Accordingly, current evidence suggests that one may
justifiably rely on the market price of the security to reflect all publicly available
information. See, e.g., Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and
the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). Moreover, this
approach to incorporating efficient market principles has the added advantage of flexi-
bility, which does not characterize the approach proposed in Note, Applying Section 12(2)
to the Aftermarket, supra, involving congressional amendment to § 12(2) and many other
attendant definitional problems.
128. This contextual analysis may be indicative of legislative intent. Because courts
presume that Congress intended the consequences that flow from reading the statute as
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under the federal securities laws, further buttresses this conclu-
sion.
A. Legislative History: In General
Adoption of the 1933 Act served a two-fold purpose. First,
Congress intended to provide prospective investors with full
disclosure through the section 5 registration obligation. 12 Con-
gress required issuers to provide "material"'130 information to
prospective investors with a sufficient cooling off period to afford
investors an opportunity to review and evaluate the required
items of disclosure.'3' Disclosure, Congress thought, coupled with
deliberative reflection by prospective investors, would promote
sound investment decisions and discourage high pressure sales
tactics and other abusive practices that, until the adoption of the
1933 Act, had allowed marginal and outright fraudulent invest-
ment schemes to flourish. 3 2
Second, Congress intended to outlaw fraud in connection with
the offer and sale of any security, 1a whether registered or un-
registered.'l 4 The 1933 Act was part of Congress' response to
the excesses in the 1920's bull market, which collapsed dramati-
a whole, and because courts construe statutory provisions in their entirety so as to give
force and effect to each provision, the relationship among statutory provisions should
shed light on the legislative purpose underlying S 12(2) relief. See O'Hara, supra note 16,
at 994-1001. Part II of this Article thus discusses together the legislative history and a
contextual analysis of S 12(2).
129. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 9, at 63.
130. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing relevant standard of
materiality).
131. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 9, at 84-87.
132. L. Logs, supra note 3, at 1-7, 93.
133. Section 12(2) refers to the purchase of a security; it says nothing about the type
of transaction. This silence is equally reflective of broad congressional intent to eliminate
fraud wherever it occurs. Moreover, 5 12(2) liability attaches to "any" person who offers
or sells to the purchaser and is not limited on its face to distribution participants. If
Congress wanted obligations to attach only to distribution participants, it knew how to
do so; for example, see S 2(11)'s definition of "underwriter" and its use of the concept of
"control person" and the complex relationship between this "underwriter" definition, the
5 5 registration and prospectus delivery requirements, and the series of exemptions
contained in S 4. Analyzing all of these statutory provisions together, one can see that
Congress clearly intended the S 5 prospectus delivery requirements to attach only to
distribution participants, including those participating in secondary distributions. See R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 9, at 70, 453-54. Congress' failure to limit similarly
the fraud prohibition of S 12(2) suggests that Congress intended S 12(2) liability to attach
to any fraudulent transaction-whether in the primary or secondary markets.
134. Indeed, S 12(2) liability specifically attaches to misstatements or omissions of
material fact in connection with registered or unregistered securities, except for those
securities exempted by 5 3(a)(2), which deals generally with government securities.
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cally on Black Monday, October 29, 1929.135 As the country grap-
pled with the Great Depression, Congress resolved to reform the
securities markets to prevent future casualties of this magni-
tude. 36 It thought this legislation would outlaw those practices
that existing common law remedies did not adequately redress.13
Congress therefore sought to create a regulatory structure with
sufficient flexibility to detect and eliminate any new strains of
fraudulent activity that Wall Street ingenuity might concoct in
the postdepression markets -including both the distribution and
the trading markets.
As such, the 1933 Act represented Congress' first step: over
the next seven years, Congress diligently worked to impose a
viable regulatory structure on all segments of the Wall Street
financial community.138 In 1933, at the time it adopted the first
piece of legislation, Congress could not have foreseen, in any
realistic way, the legislative developments that would occur over
the following seven years, culminating with the enactment of the
Investment Company Act of 1940139 and the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940.140 It is disingenuous, therefore, to assume that
Congress intended, implicitly if not explicitly, to deny section
12(2) relief in the secondary markets because it planned to address
the problem by the later statute, the 1934 Act. Indeed, as the
congressional budget debates of fall 1990 have shown, one can
never say with certainty whether Congress will adopt legislation
in the future or-even if one is lucky and guesses correctly-
that the ensuing statutory language will address adequately the
wrongful conduct that Congress intended to target. One cannot
say with any conviction, therefore, that Congress intended to
limit the 1933 Act's fraud prohibition in section 12(2) to distri-
bution transactions.' 4' It is not gainsaid, however, that Congress
intended the 1933 Act's fraud prohibition to reach broadly, that
is, to eradicate fraud in securities sales wherever it occurs.
135. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 29-36.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1022 ("Section 12(2) can perhaps best be analyzed and evaluated by
comparing it with common law (or equitable) rescission from which it was adapted ...M.
138. See sources cited supra note 11.
139. SS 1-65, 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988).
140. S 201-222, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.
141. See Abrams, supra note 36, at 905 ("The realities of the legislative process weaken
any assumption that whenever Congress enacts a statute, the lawmakers perforce know
of all related federal statutes."). Although the author is speaking to those statutes
previously enacted, the comments are just as applicable with regard to Congress' "knowl-
edge" of "future" statutes.
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Congress intended first and foremost to stamp out fraud; it could
not risk leaving the provision of relief for fraud in the trading
markets altogether to future legislation.14
Courts that deny section 12(2) relief to the defrauded
purchaser"4 in a secondary transaction do so primarily on the
grounds that the section's legislative history indicates that Con-
gress did not intend section 12(2) relief to reach the secondary
markets.1" These courts most frequently rely on the following
passage from Professor Loss' authoritative treatise as evidence
of this legislative intent: "The 1933 Act is concerned primarily
with distributions. Post-distribution trading was to be the subject
of further legislation, which turned out to be the 1934 Act."' 45
In the main, Professor Loss is correct, because the heart of
the 1933 Act is section 5, which ultimately requires registration
solely in connection with a "distribution" transaction. 46 One
142. An interesting question that further supports this line of reasoning arises: Would
we deny a S 12(2) cause of action to the defrauded buyer in a trading transaction had
Congress not seen its way to adopt the 1934 Act? Moreover, would we deny a 5 12(2)
cause of action to defrauded purchasers had the courts not seen their way to imply a
private remedy for damages pursuant to S 10(b) and its rule lOb-5? To pose the question
is to shed some light on the legislative intent underlying S 12(2); at a minimum, Congress
left the language flexible enough to allow the defrauded buyer in a trading transaction
room to sue under S 12(2). This conclusion is buttressed by case law interpretation of the
statutory language and legislative history of S 17(a)-the "other" fraud proscription in
the 1933 Act. See infra notes 187-206 and accompanying text (discussing S 17(a)). Fur-
thermore, it seems absurd to suggest that the existence of a remedy implied from the
language of an administratively adopted rule promulgated pursuant to the authority of
a later-enacted statute should operate to defeat the availability of an express cause of
action enacted earlier by Congress. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of the cumulative construction of express and implied remedies under
the federal securities laws.
143. The S 12(2) cause of action limits standing to defrauded purchasers only. Defrauded
sellers have no relief under S 12(2). The failure of S 12(2) to permit recovery by defrauded
sellers was at least part of the reason for creating an implied private remedy for damages
under rule 10b-5. See H. BLOMENTEAL, supra note 9, at 312-13; R. HAMILTON, supra note
19, at 944-49. Congress' preoccupation with providing a more liberal remedy to defrauded
buyers, while seemingly overlooking the plight of the defrauded seller, is logical in light
of the types of fraud that were pervasive in the securities markets during the 1920's:
insiders selling to unsophisticated customers securities that they knew, or had reason to
believe, were worthless. Congress, quite naturally, was more concerned with the plight
of the defrauded buyer in light of the seller abuses and fraudulent practices that had
come to light during congressional hearings in the aftermath of the 1929 crash. See
Abrams, supra note 36, at 919 n.247 and authorities collected therein.
144. See, e.g., Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,437 (N.D. Cal. 1990); First Union Brokerage v. Milos, 717 F. Supp. 1519,
1522-23 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Strong v. Paine Webber, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 4, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
145. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 92.
146. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 9, at 63-64.
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reaches this conclusion, however, only after careful analysis of
the language of section 5 as qualified by the other provisions of
the 1933 Act. Section 5's registration obligation is all-encompass-
ing; on its face, section 5 requires registration in connection with
any offer or sale, whether occurring in the distribution or trading
markets. 47 Congress did not, however, intend to burden second-
ary trading markets with these additional transaction costs.'48
Congress implemented its intent through the exemptions set
forth in section 4, most particularly section 4(1), which excludes
ordinary trading transactions from the sphere of section 5's
registration obligations. 149 One should not confuse these statutory
registration obligations with fraud. Section 5 does not deal with
fraud; fraud is prohibited by both section 12(2), which creates an
express civil cause of action for damages, 5° and section 17, which
criminalizes certain fraudulent activity.'5 ' The exemptions out-
lined in section 4 apply only for purposes of removing the trans-
action from section 5's registration obligation. Indeed, the plain
language of the statute is quite clear that all transactions, whether
registered or not, may be subject to section 12(2) liability for
fraud. Although Congress intended to limit the registration ob-
ligation to distribution transactions, it clearly did not intend to
limit similarly the reach of the fraud proscription.
Nonetheless, courts have taken this passage from Professor
Loss' treatise out of context and haverelied on it in a misleading
fashion. Indeed, in Hoxworth v. Blinder Robinson, 52 the court
rather pointedly observed that
Professor Loss merely states that the Securities Act of 1933
as a whole is primarily concerned with initial offerings. He
147. Securities Act of 1933, S 5, 15 U.S.C. S 77e (1988).
148. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 9, at 63-64. Congress did intend, however,
to impose the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of S 5 to those trans-
actions in the secondary markets that rose to the level of "secondary distributions." See
id. at 454; infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (discussing secondary distributions).
Congress' failure to limit similarly the reach of S 12(2)'s fraud prohibition is significant;
if Congress intended such a limitation, it knew how to provide for it, as seen in the
express limitations on the S 5 obligations.
149. 15 U.S.C. S 77d(1); see also L. Loss, supra note 3, at 92-96, 400.
150. 15 U.S.C. S 771.
151. Id. S 77g.
152. No. 88-0285, 0286, 0307 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
In Homworth, the court held, over defendants' vigorous objection, that the defrauded
plaintiffs, many of whom purchased penny stocks from the defendants in secondary
trading market transactions, could bring a S 12(2) cause of action against the defendants,
which included a broker/dealer firm. Id. at 22-23, 28-31.
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does not say that not 6ne section of it applies to subsequent
trading. When Professor Loss does take up Section 12(2) spe-
cifically [in a later section of his treatise,] he states: "To start
with what is clearest, the section applies to all sales of secu-
rities . ...,15
Analysis of the relationship of section 12(2) to other aspects of
the federal securities laws further supports the truth of Professor
Loss' conclusion that section 12(2) applies to all sales of securities.
The remainder of Part II of this Article therefore examines
section 12(2)'s relationship to other specific provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts, as well as to the entirety of the federal securities
laws. Consistent with recent Supreme Court instruction in the
area of statutory interpretation of the federal securities laws,
15
the goal of this contextual analysis is to discern Congress' un-
derlying purpose so as to give appropriate force and effect to
each provision of the federal securities laws, including section
12(2).
B. Cumulative Construction of Remedies
An important canon of statutory interpretation of the federal
securities laws is that the law favors the cumulative construction
of remedies.155 Historically, courts have liberally interpreted this
principle to favor broad implication of private remedies to redress
wrongful conduct in securities transactions.'5 Recently, however,
this principle has fallen to secondary importance in favor of an
approach that focuses almost exclusively on legislative history.
15
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently relied on this prin-
ciple in Herman & McLean v. HuddlestonW5 to permit an implied
153. Id. at 30 (emphasis added) (quoting L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1021).
154. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the approach that recent
Supreme Court decisibns have taken in interpreting specific provisions of the federal
securities laws).
155. The Court expressly relied upon the cumulative construction of the remedies
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts in its decision in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 383-84 (1983) ("In saving clauses included in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress
rejected the notion that the express remedies of the securities laws would pre-empt all
other rights of actions. . . .These [saving clauses] confirm that the remedies in each Act
were to be supplemented by 'any and all' additional remedies.").
156. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-35 (1964).
157. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976); see also supra
note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the proper approach to statutory interpretation
of the federal securities laws).
158. 459 U.S. 375.
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cause of action to be maintained in the face of a congressionally
approved express cause of action which specifically addressed the
fact situation presented in that case. In Huddleston, the Court
concluded that a plaintiff may maintain a rule 10b-5 claim under
the 1934 Act along with an express cause of action under section
11 of the 1933 Act for a misleading 1933 Act registration state-
ment.16 9 The Court did not find that the later-enacted section
10(b) of the 1934 Act was in derogation of the express remedies
under the 1933 Act.'16
Similarly, the Court's policy favoring cumulative construction
of remedies in the federal securities law area supports the con-
clusion that a section 12(2) remedy is available for fraud in
connection with secondary trading, notwithstanding the usual
availability of implied remedies under section 10(b) and its rule
10b-5, and perhaps other express remedies as well.16' The pur-
chaser, however, must be able to establish all of the elements of
this express cause of action. These procedural restrictions tend
in and of themselves to limit standing, thereby obviating any
concern that a cumulative construction of the remedies will open
the "floodgates of litigation."'6 2
C. Interpreting the Phrase "By Means of a Prospectus" as Used
in Section 12(2)
An examination of the significance of the "by means of a
prospectus" language as used in section 12(2) reveals another
important relationship demonstrating that section 12(2) relief is
not limited only to distribution transactions. The proper inter-
pretation of this phrase in section 12(2) depends upon reference
to the statutory definition of "prospectus" contained in section
159. Id. at 387.
160. Id. at 383-84.
161. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). Express remedies that may also be
available include, among others, SS 9 and 18 under the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 77i, 77r
(1988).
162. This phrase is borrowed from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), in which the Supreme Court adopted the
Birnbaum doctrine to limit standing in a rule 10b-5 suit only to actual purchasers and
sellers. Id. at 730-31 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)). In molding this limitation on the judicially crafted,
implied remedy of rule 10b-5, the Court expressed its concern about the danger of
vexatious litigation if it did not adopt this more restrictive rule of standing. Id. at 739-
40. Here, however, standing to bring a 5 12(2) suit is already limited to purchasers only,
and the statute's built-in privity requirement has also significantly narrowed the class of
potential defendants. Moreover, S 12(2) defendants may prove the affirmative defense of
due care; the availability of this affirmative defense should further discourage unmeri-
torious litigation.
876 [Vol. 32:847
1991] LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 12(2) OF 1933 ACT 877
2(10) of the 1933 Act.16e Section 2(10) defines "prospectus" as
essentially any writing offering a security for sale.164 Courts have
construed this language very broadly. 65 The few cases addressing
this issue have defined "prospectus" consistently with the face
value of the section 2(10) language: any written communication,
including without limitation letters, notices, prospectuses, and
advertisements,'6 offering any security for sale or confirming
the sale of any security. 167
Congress' use of the term "prospectus" within the statutory
definition of "prospectus" confirms that "prospectus" as used
throughout the 1933 Act refers broadly to "any writing" offering
a security for sale.16 The word "prospectus" as included in the
statutory definition of the same term is presumably a reference
to the stylized offering document commonly known in the secu-
rities industry as a "prospectus." Congress, however, specifically
made the offering prospectus document just one of many cate-
gories of writings to be included within the statutory definition
of the term "prospectus." Because Congress so carefully crafted
the set of definitions for use throughout the statute's remaining
provisions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that
163. 15 U.S.C. S 77b(10) (1988). Admittedly, the exceptions to this definition (that is,
S 2(OXa) describing tombstone ads and S 2(10) describing the free-writing privilege) do
not directly describe documents commonly used in connection with secondary trading,
the negative implication being that Congress intended to limit the definition of "prospec-
tus" to those documents commonly used in connection with public offerings. Any such
negative implication, however, is overcome by evidence that where Congress intended to
specifically describe "prospectus" it knew how to do so. See, e.g., § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.
S 77e(bX2) (specifically referring to a prospectus meeting the requirements of S 10(a)-a
writing commonly known as a statutory prospectus).
In addition, Congress specifically included in the S 2(10) "prospectus" definition any
writing that "confirms the sale of any security." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10). A "confirmation,"
in securities industry jargon, generally refers to the document that brokers use to confirm
execution of a customer's order previously placed with the broker. Significantly, the
confirmation slip generally is issued in connection with both distribution and postdistri-
bution transactions. Indeed, for many investors, "confirmation" is a term of art most
commonly understood by reference to the trading markets. See also Rule 10b-10, 17 C.F.R.
S 240.10b-10 (1990) (the "confirmation" rule adopted under the 1934 Act). The literal
language of the statutory definition of "prospectus" thus provides no support for an
implied limitation on § 12(2) to distribution transactions only; if anything, the statute on
its face embraces both kinds of transactions.
164. See R. JENNINGS & H. MAISH, supra note 9, at 85.
165. See 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 463 n.173 (3d ed. 1989).
166. The S 2(10) definition of "prospectus" also includes radio or television advertise-
ments. See infra note 177 (discussing the narrow area in which analysis of the term "oral
communication"-which presumably could include radio or TV media communications-
may impact whether a particular writing or document is a prospectus).
167. 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 165, at 463 n.173 and accompanying text.
168. Id-
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Congress intended to use this stylized industry reference to an
offering circular as the relevant definition of "prospectus" for
purposes of section 12(2). It hardly seems logical to assume that
legislators would labor to draft these specific definitions for terms
of common usage in the industry only to cast them aside in a
subsequent section without any clear indication of such an intent.
Nevertheless, the courts that have denied section 12(2) relief in
the case of postdistribution trading seem to have assumed that
the prospectus referred to in section 12(2) is the prospectus
commonly associated with initial offerings.169 This understanding
is flawed, however, because it completely overlooks the broad
section 2(10) definition of "prospectus," as well as the carefully
qualified use of the term "prospectus" in subsequent provisions
of the 1933 Act.
In subsequent sections of the 1933 Act, Congress specifically
delineated certain types of prospectuses, that is, certain writings
that would meet specific, congressionally imposed criteria for the
purpose of implementing the Act's disclosure requirements. Sec-
tion 10 of the 1933 Act describes two types of prospectuses.
Section 10(a) is generally referred to as the "statutory" or "final"
prospectus, because Congress mandated that it contain all of the
information required by Schedule A of the Act.170 Section 10(b),
on the other hand, authorizes preparation of a "preliminary
169. See, e.g., Ralph v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1322, 1325 (S.D. Fla.
1988); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
170. See 15 U.S.C. S 77j(a) (1988). Section 5(a) requires delivery of a statutory prospectus
prior to "sale." Id. § 77e(a). McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) j 94,423 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), provides a good illustration of
the confusion that a court's reasoning can create if it fails to appreciate fully the complex
structure of the 1933 Act and the importance of the S 2(10) definition of "prospectus."
The court in McCowan incorrectly believed that the securities must be issued pursuant
to a faulty S 10(a) type of prospectus in order for a plaintiff to pursue a S 12(2) action.
Id. at 92,726.
The court, however, either completely overlooked or misapprehended the scope of the
S 2(10) definition of "prospectus." This misunderstanding is reflected in footnote five of
the court's opinion, in which the court observed that
plaintiffs' argument that [the defendant's] monthly statements and confir-
mations to plaintiffs were "prospectuses" for the purposes of Section 12(2)
is frivolous. The purpose of a "prospectus" is to provide information about
fortwoming'events, not past events. Even if defendant's monthly statements
may be considered "prospectuses," they remain unrelated to the initial public
distribution of the securities that plaintiffs purchased from defendant.
Id. at 92,727 n.5. The court's reasoning, however, completely overlooks those decisions
that have expressly found a confirmation to be a prospectus. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Faukner,
Dawkins, & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1977); see also S 2(10), 15 U.S.C. S
77b(10) (which expressly includes "confirmation" within the statutory definition of "pro-
spectus").
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prospectus," which is a writing that sets forth the information
required by any rule that the SEC adopts pursuant to the
rulemaking authority delegated to it in section 10(b).17' Section
10(b) is not self-executing; in the absence of an enabling rule,
section 10(b) does not, by its own terms, authorize the use of any
particular "writing"-that is, "prospectus"-in the section 2(10)
definitional sense. 172
The cases denying section 12(2) liability for fraudulent activity
in trading markets inappropriately limit the interpretation of the
term "prospectus" as used in section 12(2). 1'7 None of the cases
discuss the elaborate definitional structure of this term set forth
by Congress in the statute. For example, in SSH Co. v. Shearson
Lehman Bros.,'74 the court mistakenly concluded that "[tihe phrase
&prospectus or oral communication' refers to a prospectus, regis-
tration statement, or other communication related to batch offer-
ing of securities, not to subsequent trading."175
The weaknesses of this conclusion are manifold. First, the court
offered no support in the statute or in the legislative history for
its interpretation. " Moreover, the court did not take into account
the elaborate definitional structure of the term "prospectus" that
Congress specifically set forth in the 1933 Act. It hardly seems
plausible that Congress intended the courts to ignore its exten-
sive definitional treatment in favor of an implied modification
limiting the "prospectus" definition to "communication[s] related
to batch offering[s] of securities."'177
171. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b).
172. Pursuant to its S 10(b) rulemaking authority, the SEC has promulgated rules
describing prospectuses that satisfy S 10(b), which sellers therefore may use for purposes
of the prospectus delivery requirements of S 5(bX1). See 17 C.F.R. SS 230.430, 230.430A,
230.431 (1990).
173. See, e.g., Grinsell v. Kidder Peabody & Co., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,437 (NJD. Cal. 1990); First Union Brokerage v. Milos, 717 F. Supp. 1519,
1523 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Strong v. Paine Webber, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 4, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
SSH Co., 678 F. Supp. at 1059; Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 277-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1095 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
174. 678 F. Supp. 1055.
175. Id. at 1059.
176. The court in SSH Co. relied upon a number of cases, all of which it used to
support the proposition that the S 12(2) plaintiff "must prove that his shares were issued
pursuant to the defective prospectus." Kldn, 591 F. Supp. at 277-78 (emphasis added).
The court in SSH Co., like the courts to which it cited, failed to acknowledge the 1933
Act's extensive definitional treatment of this term. Instead, these courts relied on the
bald assertion that the "purpose of the [19133 Act was the regulation of the distrfbtion
of securities. Post-distribution trading is regulated by the [19134 Act:' SSH Co., 678 F.
Supp. at 1059.
177. SSH Co., 678 F. Supp. at 1059. Another weakness of the approach used by the
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Presumably, one should equate the court's use of "batch offer-
ings" with the concept of "distribution" as that term is later
used by the court in SSH C0.178 The court in SSH Co., however,
must have had a better grasp of this rather elusive concept than
Congress did; Congress did not define the critically important
concept of "distribution."'179 As a result, the courts have struggled
court in SSH Co. is that it overlooks a whole host of writings thought to be subject to
S 12(2)'s fraud prohibition. Such writings include private offering memoranda, selling
literature in the free-writing period, Regulation D offering circulars, and so on, all of
which would be considered a prospectus within the S 2(10) definition but which may not
be thought of as a prospectus in the sense that the court in SSH Co. and other courts
have used that term. As one commentator has observed:
Section 12(2) is the only express remedy relating to the sale of securities
offered pursuant to an exemption and, in the light of Regulation D, has an
increasingly important role to play in terms of policing exemptions. It is also
applicable to fraud committed in connection with the sale of securities by
broker-dealers in organized trading markets and to negotiated transactions
effectuated outside of the organized securities markets. Section 12(2) is not
an exclusive remedy as defrauded purchasers also have a remedy under rule
10b-5 and possibly other fraud provisions.
H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 9, at 274.
Moreover, the use of the disjunctive in S 12(2) to include "prospectus" or oral com-
munication suggests that Congress intended to rely on the broad S 2(10) definition of
"prospectus" and did not intend to restrict this term to refer to new public offerings.
Indeed, relying on the broad S 2(10) definition of "prospectus" helps to make better sense
of the statute's unqualified use of the phrase "or oral communication." In Grnsell, [1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,437, the issue presented required the court
to interpret the phrase "by means of a prospectus or oral communication" as used in
S 12(2). The defendant/broker argued that the legislative history of the 1933 Act suggests
that the words "prospectus or oral communication" clearly "limit [the] application of
Section 12(2) to communications connected with an initial stock offering, and exclude
statements made pursuant to subsequent secondary market transactions." Id. at 97,229-
30. The plaintiff pointed to the same statutory language and argued that all oral
communications of the type prohibited by the statute were actionable, whether or not
made in conjunction with an initial stock offering. Id. at 97,230. Iin agreeing with the
defendant and refusing the plaintiff a S 12(2) cause of action, the court in Grnsell ignored
the definition of "prospectus" contained in 5 2(10). Id. at 97,231.
On the other hand, the district court in Elysian Federal Savings Bank v. First
Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737 (D.N.J. 1989), in construing the same phrase,
"oral communication," concluded that if Congress "intended to so narrowly limit the
application of Section 12(2), more narrow words were available to do so," such as linking
the oral communication to the term "prospectus" by such phrasing as "or related com-
munication." Id. at 750 n.17. The court in Elysian reached the better result, but its
reasoning is subject to the same criticism as that of the court in Grinsell because of its
failure to take into account the statutory definition of "prospectus." In any case, the
differing conclusions of the two courts show that one cannot properly analyze the language
of S 12(2) without reference to S 2, the statute's definitional section.
178. See SSH Co., 678 F. Supp. at 1059 ("The purpose of the 1933 Act was the regulation
of the distribution of securities.").
179. In re Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 597 (1946) (" 'Distribution' is not defined in
the [1933] Act.").
1991] LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 12(2) OF 1933 ACT
with this concept,18° as has the SEC.3 1 These efforts show that
neither courts nor agencies can easily define the concept of
"distribution"'' 2 and that its definition most certainly spills over
to include some, although not all, secondary transactions.le It is
now suggested, however, that this difficult line drawing should
be superimposed onto the availability of section 12(2) relief. To
imply a limitation that section 12(2), and indeed the 1933 Act as
a whole, reaches only distribution transactions requires the courts
to engage in difficult line drawing problems, that is, whether
given transactions involve distributions. Which of the various
concerns that the courts and the SEC have used to flesh out this
concept should be emphasized in deciding whether a given trans-
action involves a "distribution"? 184 Obviously, this inquiry is par-
ticularly fact driven and courts must resolve it on a case-by-case
basis. The definition of "prospectus," interpreted as part of the
statutory whole of the 1933 Act, provides ample guidance and
180. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122-27 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum
Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1977). In struggling to define the
concept of "public offering" for purposes of the S 4(2) private placement exemption, 15
U.S.C. S 77d(2) (1988), courts generally consider a "distribution" to be the functional
equivalent of a "public offering" and therefore rely by analogy on judicial and adminis-
trative interpretations of "distribution" to-define what constitutes a "public offering" and
vice versa. See Schneider, The Section "4 (11)" Phenomenon Private Resales of "Re-
stricted" Securities, 34 Bus. LAW. 1961, 1966 (1979). Depending on the fact situation,
courts will emphasize different concerns in deciding whether a specific transaction
constitutes a "distribution" See Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. S 230.144 (1990).
181. See Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. S 230.144; Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-6.
182. Note, however, that most of the situations in which the courts and the SEC have
struggled to define "distribution" involve an effort to define "distribution" for purposes
of determining a party's obligation to comply with the S 5 registration and prospectus
delivery requirements. Presumably, Congress did not intend to limit the S 12(2) fraud
prohibition only to distribution transactions because S 12(2) clearly states that it applies
to any person selling any security. The statutory language of S 12(2) nowhere alludes to
the concept of a "distribution," although Congress was well aware of this concept and
its significance. Congress' appreciation for the significance of the term "distribution" is
reflected in the critical role that this concept plays in the S 4(2) exemption and in the
S 2(11) definition of "underwriter".
183. See H. BLooMENTHAL, supra note 9, at 221 (discussing concept of "secondary
distributions").
184. The contours of a "distribution" are not affirmatively defined by statute or by
SEC rule, although as noted above, this concept is very important. See, e.g., Rule 10b-6
(defining "distribution" for purposes of the stabilization rules); Rule 144 (defining what is
not a "distribution" for purposes of, inter alia, the S 4(1) and S 4(3) exemptions). The
court's reliance on public offering/distribution transactions as the guide to determine
which "writings" will be subject to S 12(2) liability necessarily requires the court to
"legislate" the relevant criteria. To follow this course is contrary to recent Supreme
Court instruction in this area, which has called on the lower courts to remain true to
the specific language of the statute and to the congressional intent behind that language.
See Abrams, supra note 36, at 878-80.
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obviates any need for the courts to engage in the illusory business
of defining "distributions."18 5
D. Relationship Between Section 17(a) and Section 12(2) of the
1933 Act
The relationship between section 17(a) and section 12(2) of the
1933 Act also demonstrates that the defrauded buyer may avail
herself of the section 12(2) remedy in a trading market transac-
tion. Sections 17(a) and 12(2) overlap to some extent; section 17(a)
criminalizes certain fraudulent conduct, whereas scholars have
described section 12(2) as "the civil liability analogue to S 17."18
Courts frequently rely on the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Naftalin,ar which interpreted section 17(a), as
evidence that Congress did not intend section 12(2) to give rise
to liability in connection with postdistribution trading.as In Naf-
talin, the Court observed:
185. This Article maintains that the better way, and the one most consistent with
legislative intent, is to look to the plain meaning of the statute's definition section and
to rely on the express procedural restrictions-in particular, the built-in privity require-
ment-to limit the availability of the S 12(2) remedy. This approach is preferable to
grafting artificially some sort of standing limitation onto S 12(2)-that is, limiting S 12(2)
purchasers to those defrauded by prospectuses or writings used during the course of a
distribution transaction. As one commentator has observed:
[Section] 12(2) on its face applies to the offer or sale of any security. Thus,
subject to this exception and limited to the sales side of a transaction, S 12(2)
is coextensive in coverage with rule 10b-5 in terms of applying to both
primary distributions of securities, whether or not registered under the 1933
Act, and secondary resales of securities, whether traded on a national
securities exchange, in the over-the-counter securities market, or in a private
transaction involving the securities of a closely held corporation.
O'Hara, supra note 16, at 928 n.18 (citation omitted).
Moreover, this straightforward adherence to the language of the statute avoids the
quagmire of deciding such niceties as "when [is] the distribution transaction over," thereby
cutting off S 12(2) standing to any other "open-market purchasers." Resolution of this
issue would require the court to take up integration principles, which would generally
require a judicial hearing as integration is also peculiarly a fact-driven inquiry. See
Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2272 (Oct. 10, 1973) (discussing concept of "single issue" and setting
forth the relevant factors in making this factual determination). Reliance on the privity
requirement is a more efficient mechanism in the determination of standing than the
more slippery concept of defining "distribution."
186. See 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 165, at 384.
187. 441 U.S. 768 (1979). In its decision, the Court held that S 17(a) of the 1933 Act
applied to secondary market trading "despite the contention that that was the province
of Rule 10b-5 [of the 1934 Act] and that §17(a) should be limited to distributions." L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 1151.
188. See, e.g., Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1989); Ralph v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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Although it is true that the 1933 Act was primarily concerned
with the regulation of new offerings, [defendant's] argument
fails because the antifraud prohibition of S 17 (a) was meant
as a major departure from that limitation. Unlike much of the
rest of the Act, it was intended to cover any fraudulent scheme
in an offer or sale of securities, whether in the course of an
initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market trad-
ing.189
The Court's opinion recognized that the "primary" purpose of
the 1933 Act was to regulate new offerings through the section
5 disclosure requirements. 19 The 1933 Act disclosure require-
ments, which were the limitation to which the Court vaguely
referred, were the then newly imposed set of disclosure and
prospectus delivery requirements as established by section 5, the
heart of the 1933 Act. The Court thus saw section 17(a) as a
"major departure" from those new requirements. The Court's
reference to section 17(a) as a "major departure" is consistent
with finding section 12(2) applicable to postdistribution trading if
the "limitation" to which the Supreme Court referred is the
disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act. In this way, both sec-
tions 12(2) and 17(a) can be seen as "major departures" from the
"limitations" newly imposed by the 1933 Act: those specific reg-
istration and disclosure requirements imposed on new offerings.
The departure to which the Supreme Court referred is a depar-
ture from the registration requirements, which admittedly are
the 1933 Act's primary focus.
One should not regard section 17(a) as the only "departure"
intended to address trading market abuses. Rather, consistent
with the section 4(1) trading exemption, 19' one should read sec-
tions 12(2) and 17(a) as imposing fraud liability in any situation
that satisfies the other prerequisites of these two sections.192
Indeed, a number of courts have recently denied an implied
remedy under section 17(a) for damages,' 93 grounding the denial,
189. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 775.
191. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (discussing the S 4(1) exemption,
which serves to remove most ordinary trading transactions from the newly imposed
disclosure and registration requirements of S 5).
192. Whether § 17(a) contains an implied private cause of action is an open question
today, see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983), although the
great weight of authority contends that S 17(a) contains no implied private remedy. See
2 T. HAZEN, suyra note 31, at 182-84; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1148.
193. See, e.g., Schlifle v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1989); Krause v.
Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys.
Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1987).
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at least in part, on the notion that Congress intended the express
remedy of section 12(2), along with its well-thought-out procedural
restrictions, to be the injured parties' statutorily prescribed
recourse for any harm suffered. 194 To now imply a limitation on
this remedy-not otherwise explicitly suggested by statutory
language or legislative history-seems contradictory to, and un-
dermines the reasoning of, these section 17(a) cases.
In support of its conclusion that Congress intended section
17(a) to criminalize fraudulent conduct occurring in the trading
markets, the Court in Naftltin relied on the Senate Report
accompanying that section, which stated:
The act subjects the sale of old or outstanding securities to
the same criminal penalties and injunctive authority for fraud,
deception, or misrepresentation as in the case of new issues
put out after the approval of the act. In other words, fraud or
deception in the sale of securities may be prosecuted regardless
of whether the security is old or new, or whether or not it is
of the class of securities exempted under sections 11 or 12.195
Significantly, the Court emphasized that the language of section
17(a) itself makes "abundantly clear" that "no distinctions be-
tween the two kinds of transactions" exist.19 The Court went
beyond the statutory language and relied on the quoted excerpt
from the Senate Report as further evidence of that which the
statute made clear on its face: section 17(a) applies to ordinary
trading transactions. The Court believed that Congress had spo-
ken plainly, and therefore it "dedline[d] to manufacture ambiguity
where none exists."'1 In reaching this result, the Court expressly
acknowledged that the 1933 and the 1934 Acts do indeed "prohibit
some of the same conduct."' 98 "But '[t]he fact that there may w-ell
be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate.' "199
Finally, the Court in Naftalin observed that
neither this Court nor Congress has ever suggested that in-
vestor protection was the sole purpose of the Securities Act....
194. 3 L. Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION 1785 (2d ed. 1961).
195. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979) (quoting S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 779 (quoting United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978)).
198. Id. at 778; see also 3 L. Loss, supra note 194, at 1428 (commenting that both the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act contain antifraud provisions).
199. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778 (quoting SEC v. National See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468
(1969)).
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Prevention of frauds against investors was surely a key part
of [the purpose of the Act], but so was the effort "to achieve
a high standard of business ethics ...in every facet of the
securities industry.'
The Court relied on this quoted passage to reject any claim that
protection of investors was the exclusive concern behind Con-
gress' enactment of the 1933 Act and therefore did not address
fraud that harmed only brokers and not investors. The Court
broadly emphasized that Congress was worried about evils much
more far ranging than the narrow set of circumstances the
defendant put forward in Naftalin.21 The legislative history of
the 1933 Act requires the Court to reach the same conclusion
regarding the scope of potential liability under section 12(2).
The court in Ballay v. Legj Mason Wood Walker, Ine.202 em-
phasized this view of the Naftalin decision. Acknowledging that
the Supreme Court described the 1933 Act as "primarily con-
cerned with the regulation of new offerings,' '20 the court in Ballay
also observed that the Court's discussion in Naftalin was limited
to the antifraud provisions of section 17(a); thus, its vague char-
acterization of the remainder of the 1933 Act as dealing with
nontrading markets was dicta.2 In other words, the fraud pro-
visions of the statute are distinct from the registration obligations
of the statute, which are admittedly intended to apply only to
distribution transactions2 5 The court in Ballay therefore con-
cluded that the
Supreme Court's finding that the anti-fraud prohibition of
Section 17(a) "was intended to cover any fraudulent scheme in
an offer or sale of securities, whether in the course of an initial
distribution or in the [course] of ordinary market trading"
should apply to the other anti-fraud provision of 1933 Act as
well. After all, it has been noted that Sections 17 and 12(2)
serve the dual purpose of "rendering unlawful and authoriz[ing]
civil recovery for fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of
securities."'
200. Id. at 775 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963)); see
also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (noting that one of the purposes
of the 1933 Act was to "promote ethical standards. of honesty and fair dealing"); United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 338-39 (2d Cir. 1977) (declaring that the 1933 Act is not
solely limited to the protection of investors).
201. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 775-76.
202. No. 88-6867 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), rev'd, 925
F.2d 682 (3d Cr. 1991).
203. Id. at 13 (quoting Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78).
204. Id-
205. Id. at 13-15.
206. I& at 14 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
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Indeed, the fact that the Court found section 17(a) to apply to
postdistribution trading is equally suggestive that section 12(2)
should likewise apply to trading transactions. As with section
17(a), nothing in the language of section 12(2) limits its availability
only to distribution purchasers. Moreover, when looking to the
legislative history, one finds no suggestion that Congress in-
tended a court to graft onto the express procedural restrictions
the further limitation that section 12(2) liability attach only to
fraud occurring in connection with "distribution" transactions.
The district court cases denying section 12(2) relief to secondary
market buyers have broadly suggested that section 12(2) should
be so limited because of some vague notion that the 1933 Act is
"primarily" concerned with distribution activity. Permitting re-
covery by defrauded secondary market buyers, however, is con-
sistent with the understanding that the 1933 Act is directed
primarily at distribution activity, but also creates a civil fraud
remedy that applies to all securities transactions, in the same
fashion as does the criminal penalty of section 17(a). Nothing in
Naftatin contradicts this view.
E. Measure of Damages in a Section 12 Suit
The measure of damages that Congress prescribed in section
12 further indicates that Congress must have contemplated that
a section 12 cause of action would extend to the defrauded buyer
in a secondary market transaction.
Sellers may be held liable for a rescissionary measure of
damages in section 12(2) actions.20 A section 12(2) rescission suit
contemplates either return of the original purchase price to the
buyer upon tender of the security or a rescissionary measure of
damages calculated as the difference between the price paid and
the value at the time of suit or the amount received on resale
in the event that the security is sold during the pendency of, or
before, the suit.208 For example, assume Insider induced Buyer
to purchase from Insider one unit of ABC Company common
stock at twelve dollars per share. Buyer then discovers that
Insider purposefully deceived her about the company's financial
affairs. If Buyer still holds the security, she may sue for rescission
under section 12(2) and tender the share in return for the twelve
207. 1 T. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 331.
208. In calculating damages, a court also must take into account certain other statutorily
required modifications. See S 12(2) (for example, plus interest, less dividends received).
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dollars consideration paid. On the other hand, if Buyer has dis-
posed of the security in the trading market at ten dollars per
share, Buyer may recover two dollars from Insider, representing
the difference between the twelve dollars price paid and the ten
dollars amount received on resale to Buyer Number '2 (B2). What
then about B2, the Buyer's transferee? Assuming the price does
not decline further, B2 has not suffered any harm. If, however,
the stock further declines to seven dollars, B2 may have a cause
of action against Buyer Number 1 (B1), assuming that BI partic-
ipated in the fraud and therefore cannot establish her affirmative
defense of reasonable care. In such a case, B2 may tender the
security and recover her ten dollar purchase price from her
seller, B1. Alternatively, if B2 sold the stock when it declined to
seven dollars, then B2 could recover three dollars from B1,
representing the difference between the price paid (ten dollars)
and the amount for which B2 sold the stock (seven dollars). In
any case, B2 cannot recover from Insider under section 12(2)
because no privity exists.
This hypothetical section 12(2) damages calculation shows that
the section 12(2) procedural restrictions, particularly the built-in
privity requirement coupled with the seller's affirmative defense
of reasonable care, can substantially limit the buyer's ability to
recover under the section 12(2) express cause of action. At the
same time, however, the very nature of the remedy allowable
under section 12(2) suggests that Congress anticipated that a
buyer in a secondary market transaction would recover. More-
over, section 12(2) places no cap on plaintiff's damages, unlike
section 11 which expressly limits plaintiff's recovery to the amount
for which the security was sold in the initial, fixed price regis-
tered distribution, even if that amount would not make plaintiff
whole.2
209. For example, in the case of a hot issue, the stock may sell at the fixed public
offering price of $12 and immediately trade in the aftermarket at a substantial premium.
Assume that the price rises and that Bi (who purchased in the public offering at $12)
sells to B2 at $18; the fraud is subsequently discovered, causing the price to slide back
down to $12. In this situation, B1 has no cause of action because B1 has suffered no
harm. On the other hand, B2 (who satisfies the linear privity requirement by purchasing
in the aftermarket a unit sold pursuant to the defective registration statement) has been
harmed by the transaction because she paid $18 for stock worth $12 had the fraud not
occurred. Nevertheless, B2 cannot recover the $6 loss from any of the S 11 defendants
because S 11 limits liability to the amount for which the stock was sold in the public
offering-here, $12. In the event, however, that the stock slides further before the S 13
limitations period expires, say to $9, B2 may recover $3 under a § 11 claim, representing
the difference between the public offering price ($12) and its value at the time of the
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Analysis of the measure of damages under section 11, as
contrasted with section 12's formulation, bolsters this conclusion.
Although not expressly provided for in the statute, most courts
limit recovery under section 11 to those plaintiffs who satisfy
the judicially imposed linear privity requirement; that is, the
plaintiff must be able to trace the securities she purchased to
those that were the subject of the defective registration state-
ment.210 This requirement arose out of the courts' interpretation
of the phrase "such security" as used in section 11(a)211 Com-
mentators have criticized this requirement, however, on the
grounds that it gives a windfall to these holders because they
are able to improve their position over other holders of the same
instrument who cannot satisfy this tracing requirement. 12
suit ($9). This recovery does not make B2 whole, however, because it does not allow B2
to recover the $6 premium paid in the aftermarket. On the other hand, a S 12(2) suit
would allow B2 to sue B1 for the $18 purchase price paid by B2. Although B2's suit
against B1 satisfies the S 12(2) privity requirement, B2 may be precluded from any
recovery if B1 can prove the defense of reasonable care. Moreover, B2 is not in privity
with any S 11 defendants or Bl's seller and therefore cannot recover under 5 12(2) against
any of the perpetrators of the fraud because of the failure to satisfy the privity
requirement.
210. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1967) (interpreting "such
security" as referring to those securities that were the subject of the defective registration
statement, thereby creating the judicially imposed "linear privity" requirement). In the
case of a first time registrant, all securities trading in the postdistribution market
generally will be sold pursuant to the allegedly defective registration statement, or at
least one should be able to ascertain readily if that is the case. To the extent there are
additional units of the same class as those issued pursuant to the allegedly defective
registration statement, these other units probably were legended pursuant to a 1933
registration exemption. Generally speaking, securities issued in an exempt transaction
are "restricted," that is, not freely tradeable, and are legended accordingly. In the case
of an initial public offering, therefore, identification and segregation of the units that
were issued as part of the registered offering is usually easy. Contrast this, however,
with the situation of an established issuer selling additional units of a class that is already
issued and outstanding and therefore subject to secondary market trading. In that
situation, identification of those units that were issued pursuant to the allegedly defective
registration statement is more difficult and therefore more costly. Nevertheless, this is
an important threshold question in the case of a S 11 suit because only the holders of
shares that were "the subject of the [defective] registration statement" may recover.
Others, even though similarly situated and likewise harmed by the materially misleading
registration statement, cannot recover in a S 11 fraud suit, although they may have other
remedies available to them, such as rule 10b-5, S 12(2), or S 17(a), assuming they can
otherwise satisfy the prerequisites of these remedies.
211. See S 11(a) (introductory paragraph preceding S 11(a)(1)), 15 U.S.C. S 77k(a) (1988).
212. Scholars have criticized this interpretation of the damages calculation under S 11.
See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1038 n.64, wherein the author observed: "The open-
market buyer, however, must be able to trace his particular securities to the registration
statement when it covered additional securities of an outstanding class. This is a nonsen-
sical, but unavoidable, result of a statutory scheme that registers not classes but units
of securities."
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 12(2) OF 1933 ACT
The damages calculation that section 11 prescribes clearly does
not limit recovery only to those who purchased in a distribution
transaction. Rather, it expressly contemplates suit by an "open-
market buyer," meaning a purchaser in the postdistribution mar-
ket, who otherwise satisfies the procedural restrictions of this
express cause of action. This feature of section 11 recovery is of
particular importance in deciding whether section 12(2) liability
should similarly extend to open-market buyers. Of the two ex-
press causes of action under the 1933 Act, section 11 relates
more directly to fraud in the distribution market by virtue of
being tailored narrowly to redress material misstatements or
omissions in the registration statement. It hardly seems likely
that Congress intended to permit open-market buyers to bring a
section 11 cause of action, assuming they otherwise met the
procedural restrictions of that section, but in the next section,
section 12(2), intended to deny the defrauded open-market buyer
a section 12(2) cause of action simply because the transaction
involved postdistribution trading. The statutorily prescribed
measure of damages, therefore, clearly contemplates that section
12(2) is available to defrauded buyers outside the context of
initial distributions or, at a minimum, does not measure damages
in such a fashion as to preclude application of this formula to
fraudulent postdistribution trading transactions.
F. Interpreting the Phrase "Such Security" as Used in
Section 12
Many of those district courts that deny section 12(2) relief to
the secondary market buyer have done so based on an inappro-
priate interpretation of the phrase "such security" as used in
section 12(2).213 The rationale of these decisions is impermissibly
reminiscent of the linear privity requirement judicially imposed
under section 11 to reach the proper interpretation of the phrase
"such security" as used in section 11.
Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investorse14 is one of the earliest
decisions denying the plaintiff a section 12(2) cause of action
213. See, e.g., McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,423 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270,
277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The reasoning the courts used in these decisions also reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of the phrase "by means of a prospectus" as used in
S 12(2). See supra notes 163-85 and accompanying text (discussing the S 12(2) use of this
defined term).
214. 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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against her seller in a case in which the transaction admittedly
occurred in the postdistribution market.215 In dismissing the sec-
tion 12 cause of action, the court reasoned: "By the term 'such
security' [as used in section 12(2)] Congress meant only the
securities issued and sold pursuant to the registration statement
and prospectus." 216
The court's reliance on Barnes v. Osofsky,217 a case interpreting
the phrase "such security" as used in section 11, is misplaced
because the section 12 use of the same phrase is completely
different from both a grammatical and a policy perspective.
Grammatically, section 11 uses the phrase "such security" to
refer to those securities that are the subject of an effective
registration statement. In comparison, section 12 uses "such
security" to refer to two different situations: first, the situation
of the security sold without satisfying the section 5 registration
requirement in violation of section 12(1); and second, a security
sold "by means of" a fraudulent "prospectus or oral communica-
tion" in violation of section 12(2). Congress used the phrase "such
security" to modify both subsections of section 12 and thereby
created the privity requirement of this modified rescission cause
of action. Because the phrase does modify both subsections and
because both subsections are clear that liability may arise in the
absence of registration,28 clearly the use of the phrase "such
security" does not signify any congressional intent to refer to
"only the securities issued and sold pursuant to the registration
statement and prospectus." 219
The court's reliance on Barnes and its progeny is similarly
misplaced from a policy perspective. The court in Barnes was
aware that Congress imposed section 11 liability on the enumer-
215. Although the facts are somewhat sketchy, the plaintiffs alleged that subsequent
to their initial purchases, the issuer filed a registration statement relating to the sale of
debentures. The debentures, however, were never issued and the underlying registration
statement and prospectus were later withdrawn. The plaintiff accordingly did not pursue
a S 11 suit against the seller. Id. at 1095.
216. Id. (citing Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) (interpreting the same
"such security" language under S 11 of the 1933 Act)); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon
Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,
257 F. Supp. 875, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
217. 373 F.2d 269.
218. Indeed, courts may impose § 12(1) liability for the complete failure to register or
for defective or incomplete attempts to register. The classic situation for § 12(1) liability
involves complete failure to register coupled with the seller's failure to perfect all of the
terms of the relevant exemption. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
219. Gross, 431 F. Supp. at 1095 (emphasis added).
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ated classes of section 11 defendants to encourage their consci-
entious preparation of the required disclosure documents, thereby
enhancing the otherwise applicable common law standard of care.
Because the scope of potential personal liability was enormous,
the court in Barnes thought it was obligated to adhere strictly
to the language of the statute and narrowly construed "such
security" as used in section 11 to refer to the specific units
offered under a materially defective registration statement. 0
Consequently, the court's interpretation in Barnes of the phrase
"such security" as used in section 11 is consistent with the other
subsections of section 11 dealing with, inter alia, defendants' due
diligence and potential liability exposure. The logic and force of
this interpretation, however, does not carry over to section 12(2)
because no similar consciousness-raising policy underlies section
12(2)'s fraud prohibition. In section 12(2), Congress was concerned
with providing plaintiffs an improved remedy-over the common
law counterpart-to redress fraudulent communications, whether
written or oral.221
Moreover, the courts construing the phrase "such security" as
used in section 12(2) by analogizing to a line of authority inter-
preting the same phrase in section 11 simply misapprehended
the portent of those cases. Those section 11 cases did not construe
a phrase referrmg to distribution transactions, but rather one
modifying the concept of a "registered" offering. It is quite
different to infer from this linear privity requirement a congres-
sional intent to limit section 12(2) liability to only those transac-
tions occurring in the distributsn markets. This Article suggests
220. Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272.
221. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
222. Moreover, some policy justification may exist for so interpreting S 11, in light of
the "in terrorem" effect that Congress intended S 11 to have. See Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. dented, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
The difference in the amount of damages recoverable under S 11 versus S 12(2) tends
to show the different focus of S 11 versus S 12 liability: S 11 damages should reinforce
the "in terrorem" effect of S 11 liability and encourage due diligence on the part of S 11
defendants, whereas Congress intended S 12(2) to remedy fraud, whether or not in the
context of initial distribution. Within the context of public offerings, therefore, S 12(2)
liability is the exclusive fraud remedy against a selling group member, but its application
may extend beyond distribution markets. Otherwise, why would Congress draft such a
broad remedy as S 12(2) if it intended to address only a narrow window of fraud, that is,
fraud perpetuated by way of a "prospectus" in the sense of a S 10 prospectus used during
the course of a registered public offering? See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text
for a discussion regarding the definition of a "prospectus." In addition, the actual language
of S 12(2) does not limit a suit brought pursuant to S 12(2) to transactions in the distribution
market, as opposed to the trading market. Consequently, using the phrase "such security"
to impose judicially such a limitation on the availability of this cause of action is entirely
inappropriate.
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instead that by adding section 12(2), Congress made clear its
intent to eliminate fraud altogether by modifying common law
remedies so as to ease a plaintiffs burden of proof. This relax-
ation, however, brought with it a carefully crafted set of proce-
dural restrictions. Congress created a delicate balance, but in so
doing made no reference to "distribution" versus "trading" trans-
actions. As a result, courts should allow any defrauded buyer
who otherwise satisfies the statutory requirements to pursue a
section 12(2) claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Several courts have expressed disbelief that no federal appel-
late court has yet squarely addressed the question of whether
section 12(2) liability extends to postdistribution trading.2 This
Article, however, demonstrates that the lack of such courts of
appeals decisions is not surprising because of the general under-
standing that section 12 was available to any defrauded buyer,
whether in a distribution or a trading transaction, who otherwise
satisfied the requisite elements of this express cause of action.
This Article has attempted to focus attention on that which has
long been well accepted: section 12(2) liability extends to fraud-
ulent transactions in the trading markets as well as in the
distribution markets.
It is disturbing that this recent line of cases has called into
question a heretofore established premise under the 1933 Act:
the section 12(2) remedy is available to the defrauded buyer in
the context of both the distribution and the trading markets. 4
Courts should make clear that this defensive strategy of claiming
otherwise is unavailable and that any defrauded buyer who can
satisfy the statute's requirements may properly pursue a section
12(2) claim.
223. See, e.g., Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 11 n.3 (D.D.C. 1989). As this
Article was going to press, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals became the first appellate
court to decide this issue. See supra note 7.
224. See supra note 6 and the cases collected therein (allowing plaintiffs to proceed
with S 12(2) causes of action for fraud in secondary market transactions). These courts
never questioned the availability of this express remedy to the defrauded secondary
market buyer.
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